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UNITED STATES V. SMITHFIELD: A PARADIGMATIC EXAMPLE
OF LAX ENFORCEMENT OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT BY THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
DEREK A. YEO*
RoY A. HOAGLAND t
I. INTRODUCTION
The Commonwealth of Virginia, which has primary enforcement
authority with respect to Clean Water Act (CWA or Act)' effluent
discharge permits in the state,2 has failed for many years to take strong
enforcement action to ensure compliance with these permits. Virginia had
adopted an informal policy of seeking compliance with CWA permits
without imposing or pursuing civil penalties for permit violations. Under
this lax enforcement policy, the state has been reluctant to penalize
dischargers that have repeatedly violated permit conditions over a period
of many years. Even when Virginia has obtained penalties for permit
violations, the state has failed to recover penalties that dissipate the
economic benefit accruing to dischargers from their noncompliance with
permit limitations. Virginia's lax enforcement policy has allowed some
major dischargers to repeatedly violate their permits without fear of a
financial penalty. The result has been the degradation of Virginia's rivers,
streams, and waterways. Moreover, this problem has worsened in recent
* Derek A. Yeo, Esq., received his B.A. in Natural Sciences and Archeology from
Cambridge University in 1988, and his M.A. in Archeology from Cambridge University
in 1991. He received his J.D. from the College of William and Mary School of Law in
1998, and is currently clerking for the Hon. Eric G. Bruggink of the United States Court
of Federal Claims.
" Roy A. Hoagland, Esq., is the Virginia Assistant Director for the Virginia office of the
Chesapeake Bay Foundation. He is an adjunct professor with the T. C. Williams School
of Law clinical program. He currently holds a variety of board and committee positions
for national and regional environmental organizations. He obtained his J.D. (with honor)
from the University of Maryland School of Law and his B.S. (cum laude) from
Dickinson College.
' Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994 &
Supp. I).
2 See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
REGARDING PERMIT AND ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS BETWEEN THE STATE WATER
CONTROL BOARD AND THE REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR, REGION III ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY 10-11 (1975) [hereinafter MOU] (on file with WM. & MARY ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y REV.).
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years following initiatives to downsize and decentralize the Virginia
Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), the state agency responsible
for conducting the majority of enforcement tasks relating to Virginia's
discharge permit program.3
The weaknesses in Virginia's CWA enforcement program were
amply demonstrated in the recent, highly publicized case of United States
v. Smithfield Foods, Inc.4 In Smithfield, the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) filed suit against Smithfield Foods, Inc.
(Smithfield) in federal district court alleging thousands of violations of
Smithfield's permit to discharge effluent into the Pagan River.' EPA filed
this action despite the fact that Virginia has primary enforcement authority
for discharge permit violations, because it determined that the state had
failed to take timely and appropriate enforcement action.6 This article
argues that Smithfield is a paradigmatic example of Virginia's lax
enforcement policy, rather than an aberration.
After reviewing the basic structure of the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit program in Part II of this
article, Part III discusses the overlapping enforcement roles of the EPA
and Virginia under the Virginia permit program. Part IV of the article
relates Virginia's failed efforts to enforce the discharge permit in
Smithfield. In Part V, the article discusses other significant enforcement
failures in Virginia in recent years, which suggest that Smithfield-
although a unique case-is reflective of program-wide enforcement
' Virginia legislation enacted in 1992 established DEQ on April 1, 1993, by merging four
existing Virginia environmental agencies including the staff of the State Water Control
Board (SWCB or Board). See VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1183 (Michie 1998); JOINT
LEGISLATIVE AUDIT & REVIEW COMM'N, COMMONWEALTH OF VA., INTERIM REPORT:
REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 11 (1996) [hereinafter JLARC
INTERIM REPORT]. Prior to the creation of DEQ, the SWCB alone administered the
Commonwealth's water resource management programs, including Virginia's
responsibilities under the CWA. See JLARC INTERIM REPORT, supra, at 13.
' The district court released a number of opinions in the Smithfield case, both prior to and
following trial. Of these, three opinions are of particular note and will be discussed in this
article. First, on May 30, 1997, the court granted summary judgment for the United States
on five of the seven counts in its complaint. See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc.,
965 F. Supp. 769, 796 (E.D. Va. 1997). Second, on July 16, 1997, the court denied the
defendant's motion for reconsideration of the May 30, 1997 order. See United States v.
Smithfield Foods, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 975, 984 (E.D. Va. 1997). Third, following a bench
trial, the court imposed a civil penalty of $12,600,000 on the defendants for 5919 days of
permit violation. See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 338, 354 (E.D.
Va. 1997).
'See Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 782-83 & n.18.6 See id. at 779.
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deficiencies. Finally, in Part VI, this article argues that a recent measure
by the Virginia General Assembly, which enables the Director of DEQ to
impose civil penalties on permit violators without their consent, is unlikely
to remedy the existing problem of lax enforcement and may actually
encourage further noncompliance. This article suggests that Virginia must
adopt a tougher enforcement policy that seeks to recover, at a minimum,
the economic benefit accruing to dischargers from noncompliance with
permit conditions. Only by recovering such economic benefit can Virginia
effectively deter future noncompliance with discharge permits.
II. THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE NATIONAL POLLUTANT DISCHARGE
ELIMINATION SYSTEM (NPDES) PERMIT PROGRAM
The primary objective of the CWA is to "restor[e] and maintain the
"57chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters ....
In order to achieve this objective, the CWA sets a goal of eliminating the
discharge of pollutants into navigable waters,8 and an interim goal of
"water quality which provides for the protection and propagation of fish,
shellfish, and wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the water"
wherever attainable.9 To achieve these goals, section 303 of the CWA
required states to adopt water quality standards that "protect public health
or welfare"' and "enhance the quality of water"" in light of the designated
uses of each body of water. 2
With regard to discharges from point sources, 3 section 301 of the
Act required EPA to promulgate effluent limitations for toxic, 4
7 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994).
8 See id. § 125 1(a)(I). See also Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 16 F.3d 1395,
1399 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating that the CWA requires the reduction and eventual elimination
of discharges of pollutants). This goal, enacted as § 101(a)(1) of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, 816, called
for elimination of such discharges by 1985. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1).
" 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a)(2). This provision, also enacted in 1972, stated that this interim goal
should be achieved by July 1, 1983. See id. § 101(a)(2), 86 Stat. at 816.
10 33 U.S.C. § 1313(b)(2)(A).
It Id.
12 See id.
" The Act defines a "point source" as "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance,
including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit ... from which
pollutants are or may be discharged." Id. § 1362(14).
"4 EPA has designated sixty-five pollutants as toxic pollutants pursuant to authority granted
by section 307 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1317. See 40 C.F.R. § 401.15 (1998).
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conventional," and nonconventional' 6 pollutants at varying levels of
economic and technical feasibility. 7 Section 402 of the Act established
the NPDES permit program, under which EPA or states with EPA-
approved programs are authorized to issue permits for the discharge of
pollutants.' Discharges of pollutants that are not in compliance with such
permits are per se unlawful.' NPDES permits must incorporate effluent
limitations that ensure compliance with the effluent limitations
promulgated by EPA pursuant to section 301.2O Permits must also
incorporate inspection, monitoring, and reporting requirements consistent
with section 308 of the Act, -' which requires owners or operators of point
sources to sample effluent at regular intervals, report the results of
scientific analyses of these samples to either EPA or the EPA-approved
state agency, and to maintain records of these reports and the underlying
scientific data. These reports, which are termed Discharge Monitoring
Reports (DMRs),23 are the primary means by which EPA and state
agencies are made aware of discharge permit violations.24 Violations of
"5 EPA has designated five pollutants-biochemical oxygen demand (BOD), total
suspended solids (TSS), fecal coliform, pH, and oil and grease-as conventional pollutants.
See 40 C.F.R. § 401.16.
16 Nonconventional pollutants are those pollutants that are not designated as either toxic or
conventional pollutants by EPA. Cf 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b)(2)(F); 40 C.F.R. § 125.3(a)(2)(v).
Elements such as chlorine, nitrogen, and phosphorous fall into this category of pollutants.
Compare 40 C.F.R. pt. 122, app. D, tbl. II (listing conventional and nonconventional
pollutants), with 40 C.F.R § 401.16 (listing the five conventional pollutants).
17 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b). Section 301 directed EPA to promulgate effluent limitations
requiring "best practicable control technology" by July 1, 1977. See id. § 131 l(b)(1)(A). It
also directed EPA to promulgate more stringent effluent limitations requiring application of
"best available technology economically feasible" for toxic and nonconventional pollutants,
and "best conventional pollutant control technology" for conventional pollutants, no later
than March 31, 1989. See id. §§ 1311(b)(2)(A), 1311(b)(2)(E), 1317(a)(2). See also 40
C.F.R. § 125.3(a)(2)(ii)-(v) (implementing section 301).
8 See id. § 1342(a), (b).
'
9 Seeid. § 1311 (a).
20 See id. § 1342(a)(3), (b)(1)(A).
21Id. § 1318.
22 See id. § 1342(a)(3), (b)(2)(B).
23 See 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(l)(4)(i) (1998).
24 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Sinkins Indus., 847 F.2d 1109, 1115 n.8 (4th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769, 783 (E.D. Va. 1997) (noting that EPA
determined Smithfield's permit violations from its self-reported DMRs and citing numerous
cases in which data submitted in DMRs were the sole basis for determining liability).
Section 308 of the CWA authorizes EPA or state agencies to inspect dischargers' premises
and sample effluent discharged from point sources, see 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(4)(B), but this
option is infrequently used. See Regulation of Water Quality: Is EPA Meeting Its
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permit effluent limitations reported in DMRs, or failures by dischargers to
comply with DMR reporting requirements, subject a discharger to civil
liability because the CWA is a strict liability statute.25
Section 402 allows states to operate their own permit programs,
provided that such programs are approved by the EPA Administrator.26
The Administrator is required to approve state permit programs unless a
state's laws do not grant the state agency which would administer the
program the authority to ensure compliance with the core elements of the
NPDES program, as set out in section 402(b). Included within these core
elements is an enforcement provision: state law must authorize the state
"[t]o abate violations of the permit program, including civil and criminal
penalties and other ways and means of enforcement., 28 This provision is
designed to ensure that state environmental agencies have the ability to
enforce permits issued under state permit programs in the same manner
that EPA enforces CWA permits in states where it continues to administer
the NPDES program.
Virginia sought authority to administer its own permit program and
Obligations or Can the States Better Meet Water Quality Challenges?, in NINETEENTH
ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON THE ENVIRONMENT: FEDERAL VERSUS STATE ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION STANDARDS: CAN A NATIONAL POLICY BE IMPLEMENTED LOCALLY? 20, 22
(American Bar Association ed. 1990) (statement of James R. Elder, Director, Office of
Water Enforcement and Permits, EPA) [hereinafter Elder statement], reprinted in 22 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,029, 10,031 (1992) (noting that major NPDES facilities are only
inspected approximately once a year).
25 Section 301 states that any discharge not in compliance with § 402 "shall be unlawful,"
33 U.S.C. § 1311(a), and § 309 authorizes the EPA Administrator to assess an
administrative penalty for any permit violation. See id. § 1319(g)(1)(A). See also David R.
Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal System: Can There Not
Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority Is Shared By the United States, the States, and
Their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REV. 1552, 1567-68 (1995) (noting that the CWA "dictates strict
liability for all CWA permit violations"). Numerous courts have recognized that the CWA
is a strict liability statute, so that any violation of permit limitations subjects a discharger to
civil liability. See, e.g., Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1397 (9th Cir. 1995);
Stoddard v. Western Carolina Reg'l Sewer Auth., 784 F.2d 1200, 1208 (4th Cir. 1986).
Violations of permit limitations may also subject a discharger to criminal
liability, but to obtain a criminal conviction the government must prove that a defendant
acted either negligently or knowingly. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c).
26 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). By 1996, EPA had approved forty states to operate their own
NPDES programs. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WATER POLLUTION: MANY
VIOLATIONS HAVE NOT RECEIVED APPROPRIATE ENFORCEMENT ATTENTION 2 (1996)
[hereinafter GAO REPORT, APPROPRIATE ENFORCEMENT].
27 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(l)-(9) (1994).
2' Id. § 1342(b)(7). See also 40 C.F.R. § 123.27 (1998) (implementing this provision of the
CWA and providing detailed requirements for state enforcement authority).
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the EPA Administrator granted this authority on March 31, 1975.29
Pursuant to this authority, Virginia has established the Virginia Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (VPDES), which is similar to the NPDES
program administered by EPA.3 ° Under this program, the State Water
Control Board (SWCB or "Board"), acting upon recommendations by
DEQ, issues discharge permits and has authority to enforce compliance
with these permits.
III. ENFORCEMENT OF THE VPDES PROGRAM IN VIRGINIA
A. Virginia 's Primary Enforcement Role
Following EPA approval of a state permit program, section 309 of
the CWA provides that the state and EPA have concurrent enforcement
authority to address violations of state discharge permits. 32  The Act
implicitly recognizes, however, that the state has primary enforcement
responsibility by conditioning EPA enforcement action under section
309(a)(1) upon the state's failure to take timely and "appropriate
enforcement action" after EPA provides the state with notice of the
violation.33 In Virginia, the Memorandum of Understanding between the
29 See MOU, supra note 2, at 13.
30 See 9 VA. ADMrN. CODE §§ 25-31-10 to 25-31-940 (West Supp. 1998).
"' See id. §§ 25-31-370, -910. Following approval of a state permit program, the CWA
requires EPA to suspend issuance of permits in that state. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c). EPA,
however, retains authority to enforce compliance with state-issued permits if the state fails
to take "appropriate enforcement action." Id. § 1319(a)(1). See also infra notes 63-66 and
accompanying text (describing what types of actions are inappropriate).
12 Section 402(b) conditions approval of a state permit program upon a state's statutory
authority to enforce compliance with state-issued permits. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(7).
Section 402(i), however, states that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to limit the
authority of the [EPA] Administrator to take action pursuant to section 1319 of this title."
Id. § 1342(i). Thus, EPA retains enforcement authority even in states with approved permit
programs. See Elder statement, supra note 24, at 21, reprinted in 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 10,029, 10,029.
" See id. § 1319(a)(1). This provision requires EPA to notify the violator and the state of
the violation, and then to issue a compliance order or initiate a civil action if the state
fails to take "appropriate enforcement action" within 30 days of the notice. Id. Section
309(a)(1) thus "recognizes that states having a qualified permit program possess primary
enforcement responsibility with regard to their permits, while the EPA serves 'as a
backstop."' William L. Andreen, Beyond Words of Exhortation: The Congressional
Prescription for Vigorous Federal Enforcement of the Clean Water Act, 55 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 202, 218 (1987). In contrast, § 309(a)(3) provides that EPA may issue a
compliance order or initiate a civil action for noncompliance with a state-issued permit
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Board and EPA explicitly states that the Board (staffed and administered
by DEQ)34 is the "primary enforcement agency,"3 with EPA assuming "a
strong supporting role."36  The Memorandum of Understanding
emphatically states that "[a]ll enforcement matters will be undertaken and
expeditiously completed by the State Water Control Board,"37 but then, in
the same paragraph, reserves the EPA's authority to take direct
enforcement action under section 309.38
Virginia's primary enforcement authority is shared between DEQ
and its SWCB and the Office of Attorney General (OAG), with DEQ
taking the lead role.39 In administering the State Water Control Law4 in
conjunction with the SWCB, DEQ may choose to take the following
enforcement actions with regard to permit violations:
1. Issue a notice of violation (NOV) which puts the violator on notice
of the permit violation but does not impose any civil penalty on the
violator;
2. Recommend that the Board issues a Special Order directing the
violator to comply with the terms of its permit or to take steps to
achieve compliance;4
3. Issue a Special Order enjoining further violations of permit
conditions for up to one year, which may include a civil penalty of
without providing prior notification to the violator or the state. See 33 U.S.C. §
1319(a)(3); Andreen, supra, at 218.
34 Following its creation in 1993, DEQ took over the administration of the VPDES program.
See supra note 3 and accompanying text. Although the staff of SWCB are now employees
of DEQ, the SWCB remains a semi-independent body because the seven board members
are independently appointed. See JLARC INTERIM REPORT, supra note 3, at 13. The
SWCB retains plenary authority to approve all enforcement actions recommended by DEQ.
See 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 25-31-910; JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT & REVIEW COMM'N,
COMMONWEALTH OF VA., REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 76
(1997) [hereinafter JLARC REPORT].
" MOU, supra note 2, at 2.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 See id. ("The foregoing shall not be construed to limit the authority of the [EPA] Regional
Administrator to take action pursuant to Section 309 or 504 of the Act.").
'9 See JLARC REPORT, supra note 34, at 75. The Virginia General Assembly has
authorized DEQ to administer the VPDES program, including enforcement of VPDES
permits. See VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1186 (Michie 1998) (granting DEQ the general power
to "[i]mplement all regulations as may be adopted by... the State Water Control Board").40 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-44.2 to -44.34:28.
41 The Board has authority to issue injunctive Special Orders. See id. § 62.1-44.15(8a).
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not more than $10,000;42
4. Recommend that the Board issues a Special Order imposing a civil
penalty for past permit violations-subject to a limitation of
$25,000 per day of violation and the consent of the violator to the
amount of the penalty;43
5. Recommend that the Board refer the case to OAG to initiate a civil
action in state court; 44
6. Recommend that the Board refer the case to the appropriate
Commonwealth Attorney's office to prosecute a criminal action in
state court.
45
DEQ thus has a wide range of enforcement alternatives available to
it, though most of these alternatives are subject to approval by the SWCB,
or the willingness of the OAG or Commonwealth's Attorneys to act on the
referrals, or both. Of course, DEQ also has the option of taking no action.
In order to determine whether to take any enforcement action,
DEQ follows a NOV point system.46 Under this system, DEQ auditors
first review DMRs submitted by permittees to identify permit violations.47
Violations are then assigned points values based on the seriousness of the
violation.48 If a permittee accrues four or more points within any six-
month period, the case is referred to DEQ's enforcement staff for action
pursuant to one of the alternatives listed above. 49  Generally, DEQ
negotiates a consent order with the violator which requires remedial action
to address the permit violations."0
42 See id. §§ 10.1-1182, -1186. On April 17, 1996, Governor George Allen approved House
Bill 1008, which granted DEQ this authority. See H.B. 1008, 1996 Leg., Reg. Sess., 1996
Va. Acts ch. 1005. This authority became effective on July 1, 1996.
" The SWCB has authority to issue Special Orders assessing civil penalties "with the
consent of any owner who has violated.., any condition of a permit." VA. CODE ANN. §
62.1-44.15(8d). Penalties are subject to a limit of $25,000 per violation, and "[e]ach day of
violation of each requirement shall constitute a separate offense." Id. § 62.1-44.32(a).
41 Penalties imposed by Virginia courts pursuant to civil actions brought by OAG are also
subject to the $25,000 limitation for each day of violation for each permit limitation. See id.
" A willful or negligent violation of a permit limitation is classed as a misdemeanor; a
knowing violation is classed as a felony. See id. §§ 62.1-44.32(b), (c).46 See JLARC REPORT, supra note 34, at 76.
47 See id.
48 See id.
49 See id.
'0 See id.
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B. EPA's Enforcement Role
Although the CWA recognizes approved states as the primary
enforcers of the NPDES permit program, EPA retains its enforcement
authority even in these states."' In Virginia, the Memorandum of
Understanding explicitly recognizes EPA's authority to take direct
enforcement action, notwithstanding DEQ's role as the primary
enforcement agency." The enforcement options available to EPA are set
out in section 309 of the Act. Under this section, EPA may:
1. Notify a permit violator and the state of the permit violation and
then, if the state fails to commence appropriate enforcement action
within thirty days, either issue an order directing the permittee to
comply with its permit or refer the matter to the Department of
Justice (DOJ) to file a civil action in federal district court; 3
2. Directly issue a compliance order to the permittee or refer the
matter to DOJ to commence a civil action;54
3. Assess a Class I administrative civil penalty of up to $25,000, after
consultation with the state and an informal hearing;5
4. Assess a Class II administrative civil penalty of up to $125,000,
after consultation with the state and a formal hearing on the
record; 6
5. Refer the matter to DOJ for prosecution of criminal charges.57
Moreover, EPA is not generally barred from taking enforcement
action even after Virginia has initiated or completed its own enforcement
action. Section 309(g), which authorizes EPA to issue administrative
penalties, states that a permittee is not subject to a court-imposed civil
"' See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(i); supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
52 See MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note 2, at 10.
" See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1).
54See id. § 1319(a)(3).
" See id. § 1319(g)(1), (2)(A). A Class I civil penalty may not exceed $10,000 per
violation, in addition to the overall $25,000 maximum penalty per order. See id. §
1319(g)(2)(A).
5, See id. § 1319(g)(1), (2)(B). A Class II civil penalty is subject to a limitation of $10,000
per day of violation in addition to the overall $125,000 maximum limit per order. See id. §
1319(g)(2)(B). The formal hearing required by § 309(g)(2)(B) must comply with the
procedures of section 554 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554. See 33
U.S.C. § 1319(g)(2)(B).
5" Section 309(c) provides varying levels of criminal penalties for negligent or knowing
violations of permit conditions. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c).
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penalty if EPA or an approved state is pursuing an administrative action
against the permittee5 8 This provision bars EPA from filing civil actions
for damages where an approved state is "diligently prosecuting" the
violator under a state law provision comparable to section 309(g). 9 Aside
from this one provision, there is no other statutory bar to an EPA
enforcement action either concurrent with, or subsequent to, a state
enforcement action. EPA may thus "overfile" an ongoing or completed
state civil enforcement action by referring a case to DOJ for litigation in
federal court or by assessing an administrative civil penalty against the
permit violator.6" Alternatively, if an approved state is diligently
prosecuting an administrative action against the violator, or has recovered
a penalty from the permittee by means of an administrative penalty, EPA
may overfile solely by assessing an administrative penalty.6
Although it possesses this broad authority to overfile in approved
states, EPA rarely asserts this authority for two reasons. First, EPA has
stated as a matter of policy that it will only take such action in narrowly
limited circumstances in deference to the primary enforcement
responsibility of approved states.6" The principal reason for direct EPA
enforcement is the failure of an approved state to take "timely and
" See id. § 1319(g)(6)(A).
'9 See id. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii). In the only decision to date that has considered whether
Virginia's law is comparable to § 309(g), the district court in Smithfield held that Virginia's
law did not meet this test, at least as of the last Special Order issued by the SWCB in that
case. See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769, 777, 795 (E.D. Va.
1997).
60 Compare Enforcement of Environment and Public Works: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works, 105th Cong. 161 (1997) [hereinafter Senate Oveifiling
Hearing] (statement of Hon. Steven Herman, Assistant Adm'r, Office of Enforcement and
Compliance Assurance, EPA) ("Federal overfiling is the initiation of a Federal enforcement
action, either administrative or civil, following a State enforcement action.") with Elder
statement, supra note 24, at 21, reprinted in 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,029,
10,030 ("Overfiling occurs where the state has taken enforcement action that we find so
grossly deficient that we step in and file our own federal civil action." (emphasis added)).
This article will use the more expansive definition provided by Assistant Administrator
Herman.
61 Section 309 bars federal overfiling by means of civil actions where the state law is
"comparable" to section 309(g). See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(g)(6)(ii), (iii). But see Hodas,
supra note 25, at 1589 (noting that EPA is unlikely to issue an administrative penalty if the
state enforcement action has abated the pollution).
62 See OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE MONITORING, EPA, POLICY
FRAMEWORK FOR STATE/EPA ENFORCEMENT AGREEMENTS 21 (1986) [hereinafter POLICY
FRAMEWORK] (on file with the WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.).
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appropriate enforcement action."63 This may occur if the state fails to
"mov[e] expeditiously to resolve the permit violation,"'  or "if remedies
are clearly inappropriate to correct the violation, if compliance schedules
are unacceptably extended, or if there is no appropriate penalty or other
sanction."6 The term "inappropriate penalty" is narrowly defined as one
that is "grossly deficient after considering all of the circumstances of the
case and the national interest."66 Second, EPA lacks the resources to bring
direct enforcement actions in approved states very often. Under the CWA,
EPA is responsible for enforcement of the NPDES permit program in the
ten non-approved states67 and for overseeing state enforcement in the forty
approved states.68 With these existing responsibilities, EPA simply lacks
the resources to bring many direct enforcement actions in approved
states.69
Overfiling by EPA is therefore a "rare event."7 This is especially
true in Virginia, where EPA declined to overfile in federal court for the
ten-year period prior to 1991.7" For policy and fiscal reasons, EPA prefers
to coordinate enforcement with an approved state so that only one
government agency pursues an enforcement action.72
As a practical matter, EPA relies upon data submitted to it by
approved states to determine the existence of permit violations which may
require direct enforcement action. EPA regulations require approved
states to submit quarterly noncompliance reports (QNCRs) listing
63 See id.
64MId. at 22.
65 Id. at 22-23.
66 1d. at 23.
67 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(7) (1994). These ten states are: Alaska, Arizona, Idaho,
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas.
See GAO, APPROPRIATE ENFORCEMENT, supra note 26, at 2 n.6.
61 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(2).
69 See POLICY FRAMEWORK, supra note 62, at 21; Hodas, supra note 25, at 1587.
"0 Senate Oveifihing Hearing, supra note 60, at 161 (statement of Steven Herman). In the
twelve months prior to June 1997, DOJ filed only two CWA overfiling cases on behalf of
EPA. See id. at 67 (statement of Lois Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, Env't and
Natural Resources Div., DOJ). In Fiscal Year 1996, EPA overfiled only on four occasions;
and in the prior two fiscal years EPA overfiled in eighteen cases. See id.
" See Letter from David S. Bailey, Director, Virginia Office, Environmental Defense Fund,
to Dr. Eileen Choffnes, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 3 (Aug. 12, 1991)
[hereinafter Bailey Letter], reprinted in Management Deficiencies in Environmental
Enforcement: "Forceless Enforcement": Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Governmental Affairs, 102d Cong. 249 (1991) [hereinafter Senate "Forceless Enforcement"
Hearing].
72 See Senate Oveifiling Hearing, supra note 60, at 4 (statement of Lois Schiffer).
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permittees that are in significant noncompliance with permit conditions.73
Significant noncompliance 4 can arise from failure to comply with permit
effluent limitations, reporting requirements, or compliance schedules, or
failure to comply with compliance schedules, reporting requirements, or
other conditions in enforcement orders.75 Once a permittee appears on an
approved state's QNCR, EPA begins to track the state's actions to achieve
compliance.76 If the permittee does not come into compliance, EPA may
then act if the state fails to take timely and appropriate enforcement
action.77
IV. SMITHFIELD AS THE PARADIGMATIC EXAMPLE OF VIRGINIA'S LAX
ENFORCEMENT POLICY
A. Background to the Smithfield Case
1. Smithfield's Operations
Smithfield has operated hog slaughtering and processing facilities
in the town of Smithfield, Virginia, for more than forty years. Smithfield
operates two hog processing and packing plants in Smithfield-the
Smithfield Packing Company, Inc. (Smithfield Packing) and Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd. (Gwaltney) plants-each of which discharged treated
wastewater through an "outfall"78 into the Pagan River, a tributary of the
71 See 40 C.F.R. § 123.45(a) (1998).
7' Although the term is not defined in EPA regulations, it encompasses all Category I
noncompliance as defined in those regulations. See id. § 123.45(a)(E)(2)(ii); Telephone
Interview with Leonard Nash, Office of Compliance and Enforcement, Water Protection
Div., EPA Region III (Feb. 23, 1998) [hereinafter Nash Interview].
71 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 123.45(a)(2)(ii)(A)-(D). To be classified as significant noncompliance,
violations of permit effluent limitations must exceed the criteria set out in an appendix to the
EPA regulations. See § 123.45 app. A. Under these criteria, significant noncompliance
occurs if (1) the level of a Group I pollutant exceeds the monthly average permit limitation
by 40% or more at least twice in a six-month period; (2) the level of a Group II pollutant
exceeds the monthly average permit limitation by 20% or more at least twice in a six-month
period; or (3) the level of any pollutant exceeds the monthly average permit limitation by
any amount at least four times in a six-month period. See id.; GAO REPORT, APPROPRIATE
ENFORCEMENT, supra note 26, at 3. Group I pollutants correspond approximately with
conventional and nonconventional pollutants, and Group II pollutants are roughly
equivalent to toxic pollutants. Compare 40 C.F.R. § 123.45, app. A, with §§ 401.15,
401.16. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
76 See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769, 778 (E.D. Va. 1997).
7' See id.
78 An outfall is essentially a large pipe that allows transport of wastewater directly into
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James River.79 Wastewater from the plants eventually flowed into the
Chesapeake Bay. In June 1996, the Gwaltney plant was connected to the
Hampton Roads Sanitation District (HRSD) public water treatment
system,80 and in August 1997, the Smithfield Packing plant was similarly
connected.8 Today neither plant discharges wastewater into the Pagan
River.12 Prior to these connections, the plants discharged wastewater into
the Pagan River pursuant to a succession of VPDES permits.83
2. The Problem: Pollution of the Pagan River
The Pagan River is a relatively shallow estuary that is used by the
public for a variety of recreational uses, including boating, fishing,
crabbing, hunting, and swimming.84 Prior to the connection to the HRSD
system, the wastewater discharged by the Smithfield plants contained
significant levels of phosphorous, nitrogen, and fecal coliform, among
other pollutants.8" The high levels of these three pollutants in the Pagan
River have had serious environmental effects. In 1970, the Virginia
Department of Health condemned the river for shellfish harvesting due to
the high level of fecal coliform present in the river.86 The Department
subsequently has revised and extended this ban on at least sixteen
occasions and it remains in effect today.87 As a result of the continuing
some body of water.
" See Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 772-73. Smithfield acquired the Gwaltney plant from
ITT-Continental Baking Company on October 27, 1981 and assumed responsibility for
wastewater discharged from the facility. See Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Gwaltney
of Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d 304, 306 (4th Cir. 1986), vacated on other grounds, 484 U.S.
49 (1987).
80 See Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 773.
8! See Smithfield Foods Ends Waste Discharges, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 1997, at B3.
'2 See id.
83 See Gwaltney, 791 F.2d at 306; Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 774, 776.
84See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 338, 344 (E.D. Va. 1997).
85See id. at 345-47.
86 See id. at 347; DEP'T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, COMMONWEALTH OF VA. & DEP'T OF
CONSERVATION & RECREATION, COMMONWEALTH OF VA., VIRGINIA WATER QUALITY
ASSESSMENT FOR 1996 AND NON-POINT SOURCE POLLUTION WATERSHED ASSESSMENT
REPORT: 305(B) REPORT TO EPA AND CONGRESS, app. F, at F-5 (1996) [hereinafter 305(B)
REPORT].
"' See 305(B) REPORT, supra note 86, at F-5. Although Smithfield asserted at trial that
discharge from the Town of Smithfield's wastewater treatment plant was a more significant
source of fecal coliform pollution of the Pagan River than its plants, see Smithfield, 972 F.
Supp. at 347, the district court noted that "based on flow, fecal coliform levels coming from
defendants were five times the levels coming from the Town of Smithfield." Id. Perhaps
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high fecal coliform levels, principally from the Smithfield plants, Virginia
currently lists an almost three-mile long section of the river as "impaired,"
with a priority rank of "high."88 According to this report, "[t]he major
source of impairment on the Pagan River is the discharge from the
Smithfield Foods wastewater treatment facility."89  In 1997, American
Rivers, Inc., one of the nation's leading river conservation organizations,
listed the Pagan River as one of the twenty most threatened rivers in the
country because of these high levels of fecal coliform.9 '
Phosphorous and nitrogen are nutrients that, if present in large
quantities, can cause eutrophication 9' and destroy submerged aquatic
vegetation (SAV). 92 The Pagan River is eutrophic and contains no
significant stands of SAV.93 In addition, EPA's Chesapeake Bay Program
has designated the river as severely stressed with regard to phosphorous. 94
Following presentation of expert testimony in the Smithfield case, the
district court concluded that the high levels of phosphorous and nitrogen in
the Pagan River are caused in major part by wastewater discharged from
the Smithfield plants.9  The court further concluded: "[M]ost of
defendants' Permit discharge exceedances clearly had a severe and
significant impact on the water quality of the Pagan River, in light of their
most significantly, the court also noted that fecal coliform levels in the river peaked in the
vicinity of the Smithfield Packing outfall, not at the outlet from the town's treatment plant.
See id.
" VIRGINIA DEP'T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, 1996 303(D) TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD
PRIORITY LIST 1-98 (1996).
89 Id.
90 See AMERICAN RIVERS, INC., NORTH AMERICA'S MOST ENDANGERED AND THREATENED
RIVERS OF 1997 35 (1997).
' "Eutrophication is the over stimulation or overproduction of organic carbon in an estuary.
Excessive nutrient loadings stimulate productivity of algae, which decreases sunlight to
plants, and causes increased algae growth on plants and increased turbidity." Smitlfield,
972 F. Supp. at 344.
" See id. at 345. "SAV is a critical component of the ecosystem. It has tremendous habitat
value, as there are generally more fish, crabs, and benthic (bottom-dwelling) organisms in
habitats with SAV than in habitats without SAy." Id.
"3 See id. at 346. On EPA's eutrophication index, "the Pagan River scores a 5 on a scale of
1 to 5, with 5 being the most eutrophic." Id.
14 See id. at 345.
" The court noted that Smithfield was responsible for "approximately 87% of phosphorous
entering the Pagan River" in the period between December 1991 and February 1997, see id.
at 345 n.12, and that Smithfield's nitrogen loadings "comprised approximately 63% of the
nitrogen entering the Pagan River during this time period." Id. at 345 n.13. Although
Smithfield is not the sole cause of the eutrophication of the river, the district court found
that it clearly contributed to this condition. See id. at 346.
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frequency and severity. The harm to the environment and the risk to
human health caused by defendants' numerous effluent limit violations are
serious .... ,,96
B. The Smithfield Case
Virginia's enforcement in the Smithfield case can only be
understood in light of the history of the permits issued by the SWCB to
Smithfield, the failure of Smithfield to comply with the conditions of these
permits, and the subsequent concerted, though unsuccessful, attempts by
Virginia to modify these permits.
1. Smithfield's Discharge Permits
Smithfield operated the Smithfield Packing and Gwaltney plants
under a succession of discharge permits, but the only two permits at issue
in Smithfield were the permits issued on May 13, 1986, 97 and January 3,
1992.98 Both permits contained effluent limitations for a number of
pollutants, including fecal coliform, total Kjeldahl nitrogen (TKN),
chlorine, oil and grease, pH, biological oxygen demand (BOD), and total
suspended solids (TSS). 99
On January 4, 1990, the SWCB modified the 1986 Permit to
include an effluent limitation for phosphorous so that the permit would
comply with Virginia's Policy for Nutrient Enriched Waters, which
Virginia had promulgated in 1988.'00 EPA approved this permit
modification, as required by EPA regulations implementing the CWA and
" Id. at 347-48 (emphasis added).
9' See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769, 774 (E.D. Va. 1997).
" See id. at 776. The 1986 Permit (and later the 1992 Permit) covered discharges from both
Smithfield facilities. See STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD, COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,
A SPECIAL ORDER ISSUED TO SMITHFIELD FOODS, INC., at 1 [hereinafter 1986 SPECIAL
ORDER] (on file with the WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.). Prior to 1986,
Smithfield held a separate permit for each facility, see id., because Smithfield acquired the
Gwaltney plant in 1981 and assumed responsibility for compliance with the prior owner's
permit. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
" Cf Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 779, 780 n.16 (noting that the United States' complaint and
brief alleged violations of permit limitations for these pollutants). The permits also required
Smithfield to monitor wastewater discharged from the outlets at prescribed intervals, report
the results of wastewater sampling in DMRs submitted to DEQ, and retain all sampling and
analysis data for three years. See id. at 774.00 See id. at 774.
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the Memorandum of Understanding."' The phosphorous limitation in the
modified permit did not take effect immediately, however; the modified
permit included a construction schedule for improvements to the
Smithfield treatment plants which required full compliance with the
effluent limitation within three years-by January 4, 1993.102 The
phosphorous limitation and January 4, 1993 compliance date were carried
over into the 1992 permit.0 3  The 1992 Permit also added effluent
limitations for three additional pollutants-ammonia-nitrogen, cyanide,
and chemical biological oxygen demand (CBOD)-and required
Smithfield to achieve compliance with these new limitations by May 13,
1994.104 Aside from the January 1990 modification of the 1986 Permit,
there were no other modifications to the 1986 or 1992 Permits.' 05
2. Permit Violations
The United States alleged numerous violations of effluent
limitations and reporting requirements in its complaint in the Smithfield
case. 10 6  At trial, EPA submitted copies of Smithfield's DMRs,
establishing that Smithfield was liable for 5919 days of violation of
'0' See id. EPA regulations allow the Director of DEQ to modify a VPDES permit for a
number of enumerated causes if he or she complies with 40 C.F.R. § 124.5(c). See 40
C.F.R. § 122.62 (1997). Section 124.5(c) requires the Director to prepare a draft permit
incorporating the proposed modifications. See id. § 124.5(c)(1). The Director must then
submit the draft permit to the EPA Regional III Administrator for approval following an
opportunity for a public hearing. See id. §§ 124.6, 124.15. Virginia, therefore, is not
authorized to modify VPDES permits without approval by EPA.
Similar provisions are included in the Memorandum of Understanding. It states
that the SWCB will grant NPDES permits "only after objections of the Regional
Administrator have been resolved to the mutual satisfaction of both parties." See MOU,
supra note 2, at 7. It also notes that permit modifications are subject to the same
objection procedures. See id at 2.
102 See Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 774. The modified permit set four construction
milestones and a final deadline for compliance with the phosphorous limitation. See id.
The first two construction milestones required Smithfield to initiate design of improvements
to its wastewater treatment plants within 30 days of January 4, 1990, and to submit
construction plans to the Board within 90 days after the first milestone. See id. The latter
two construction milestones were to be triggered by the Board's approval of these plans.
See id.
1o3 See id. at 777.
104 See id.
'05 See id. at 790.
'06 See id. at 779-80.
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effluent limitations since December 1991.107 The large majority of
violations-5112 days of violation-were for exceedances of the
phosphorous effluent limitation after the January 4, 1993, compliance date
for that limitation.'0 8 The district court found violations of effluent
limitations for eight other pollutants: ammonia-nitrogen (459 days), TKN
(200 days), fecal coliform (seventy-two days), TSS (sixty-three days), pH
(four days), cyanide (four days), chlorine (four days), and oil and grease
(one day)." 9 The court also found 1063 days of violation for a number of
violations of record keeping and reporting requirements in Smithfield's
permit."0 In total, the court found Smithfield liable for 6982 days of
violation of its permit since December 1991. "'
As a result of these violations, Smithfield was subject to a statutory
107 See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 338, 341-42 (E.D. Va. 1997).
Because the United States filed its complaint in December 1996, see Smithfield, 965 F.
Supp. at 779, the five-year statute of limitations that governs recovery of civil fines by the
government prevented EPA from recovering civil penalties for violations prior to December
1991. See 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1994). See also United States v. Banks, 115 F.3d 916, 918
(11th Cir. 1997) (holding that § 2462 applies to CWA enforcement actions for civil
penalties); United States v. Hobbs, 736 F. Supp. 1406, 1409 (E.D. Va. 1990) (holding the
same); EPA v. City of Green Forest, 921 F.2d 1394, 1408 (8th Cir. 1990) ("The statute of
limitations for CWA violations is five years."). W. Michael McCabe, EPA's Region III
Administrator, commented that, absent this five-year statute of limitations, EPA could have
established many more CWA violations. See Ellen Nakashima & Spencer S. Hsu, EPA
Sues Smithfield in Rebuke of Va., WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 1996, at B1 (quoting W. Michael
McCabe).
lo' See supra note 102 and accompanying text. Smithfield claimed that a May 9, 1991,
Special Order negotiated with DEQ and approved by the SWCB exempted Smithfield from
complying with the phosphorous limitation if Smithfield agreed to connect to the HRSD
water treatment system, which Smithfield later did. See Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 784.
See also iiifra notes 147-152 and accompanying text. The district court rejected this claim.
See Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 787-90.
109 See Smithfield, 972 F. Supp. at 341-42. The violations of the ammonia-nitrogen and
cyanide effluent limitations occurred after the May 13, 1994 compliance date for these
pollutants. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. Smithfield claimed that a
November 8, 1994, Special Order negotiated with DEQ and approved by the SWCB waived
Smithfield's noncompliance with these limitations because Smithfield had earlier agreed to
connect to the HRSD water treatment system. See Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 784. The
district court rejected this claim. See id. at 787-90.
110 See Smithfield, 972 F. Supp. at 342. The majority of these violations-884 days of
violation-resulted from the destruction of approximately two years of sampling and
analysis records by Terry Rettig, the chief operator of Smithfield's wastewater treatment
plants, in July 1994. See id. Smithfield was also found liable for submitting DMRs with
falsified data (fifteen days) and submitting its 1993 toxics management plan and September
1994 DMR after the deadlines specified in the 1992 Permit (164 days). See id.
.. See Smithfield, 972 F. Supp. at 342.
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maximum penalty of $174,550,000.12 After considering the criteria
mandated by section 309(d) of the CWA," 3 the court assessed Smithfield a
civil penalty of $12,600,000. 14
3. Virginia s Enforcement Efforts
Virginia, acting through DEQ and the SWCB, has a long history of
attempts to enforce compliance with the terms of Smithfield's CWA
discharge permits." s  On only one occasion, however, has Virginia
obtained a civil penalty against Smithfield." 6 This is despite the fact that,
'
2 See id. at 343. The CWA provides that each day of violation subjects a permit violator to
a civil penalty of up to $25,000. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1994).
" See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d). This provision requires a court to "consider the seriousness of
the violation or violations, the economic benefit (if any) resulting from the violation, any
history of such violations, any good-faith efforts to comply with the applicable
requirements, the economic impact of the penalty on the violator, and such other matters as
justice may require." Id.
In considering the seriousness of the violations, the court noted that the effluent
violations were "frequent and severe." Smithfield, 972 F. Supp. at 344. "On average,
defendants exceeded the phosphorous limits by 1055%, fecal coliform limits by 1365%,
ammonia limits by 97%, cyanide limits by 168%, oil and grease limit by 114%, and the
TSS limit by 63.5%." Id.
1"4 See id. at 354.
"' See, e.g., Richard Stradling, State Sues Smithfield Foods, DAILY PRESS, Aug. 31, 1996, at
Al (noting that Smithfield's "water pollution problems go back to the mid-1970s, when the
state first ordered it to stop violating its pollution permit").
116 In September 1983, the Board referred the Smithfield Packing case to the OAG to initiate
a civil suit for violations of the TKN effluent limitation in the company's permit. See
DEP'T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, ENFORCEMENT
RECOMMENDATION PLAN app. E (1996) [hereinafter ENFORCEMENT RECOMMENDATION
PLAN] (on file with the WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.). Virginia sued Smithfield
Packing in the Isle of Wight County Circuit Court and obtained a court order in January
1984 that directed Smithfield Packing to upgrade its wastewater treatment plant and comply
with the TKN limitation and other permit conditions by May 1984. See id. When the
company subsequently violated its permit, and thus failed to comply with the court order,
the Circuit Court, in December 1984, assessed a $40,000 civil penalty against the company
for contempt of court. See id.; Telephone Interview with John Butcher, Assistant Attorney
General for the Commonwealth of Virginia (Mar. 10, 1998) [hereinafter Butcher Interview].
Virginia sued Smithfield Packing after the Chesapeake Bay Foundation gave the
state a sixty-day notice of its intention to sue that company and Gwaltney for violations
of effluent limitations in their permits, as required by the CWA's citizen suit provision.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A) (1994). Virginia elected to sue Smithfield Packing but not
to sue Gwaltney. See Butcher Interview, supra. The Chesapeake Bay Foundation then
filed a citizen suit in federal district court against Gwaltney, alleging violations of
effluent limitations for five pollutants. See Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltney of
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according to Virginia, Smithfield has violated its permits on literally tens
of thousands of occasions." 7
Within the relevant time-frame of the Smithfield case-from May
1986, when the SWCB issued the 1986 Permit, until May 30, 1997, the
date of the first district court decision in Smithfield-SWCB and DEQ
have employed a number of enforcement techniques against Smithfield:
Special Orders, notices of violation, and the pending civil enforcement
action in state court. Each of these enforcement measures will be
considered in turn.
a. Special Orders
Virginia has entered into at least six Special Orders" 8 with
Smithfield since May 1986 in an attempt to eliminate permit violations. A
review of these actions shows, however, that the practice of entering
Special Orders did little (if anything) to deter future permit violations and,
in fact, probably encouraged further noncompliance by Smithfield.
Moreover, Virginia appears to have used Special Orders as a means of
Smithfield, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 1542, 1544 (E.D. Va. 1985), aff'd, 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir.
1986), vacated, 484 U.S. 49 (1987). After remand to the district court, the Fourth Circuit
affirmed a civil penalty of $289,822 for violations of the permit's TKN limitation. See
Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 890 F.2d 690, 698 (4th Cir.
1989). Therefore, even after an adverse Supreme Court ruling, which prevented the
Chesapeake Bay Foundation from suing for wholly past violations, see Gwaltney, 484
U.S. at 58-59, the plaintiff recovered a civil penalty more than seven times greater than
that recovered by Virginia-in the case that Virginia had deemed to be less worthy of an
enforcement action.
" 7 Virginia presently has a lawsuit pending in the Circuit Court for Isle of Wight County
against Smithfield for numerous violations of its 1986 and 1992 Permits. See, e.g., Richard
Stradling, Sinithfield Foods Fights Va. Pollution Suit, DAILY PRESS, Dec. 3, 1997, at Cl. In
this suit, Virginia has alleged more than 22,000 violations of Smithfield's discharge permits
since 1986. See id. Virginia Assistant Attorney General John Butcher noted that only six
percent of these alleged violations overlap with the 6982 violations established in the United
States v. Smithfield case. See id.
"' "Special Order" is the term used by DEQ and the Board to refer to consent decrees
entered into by the SWCB and CWA permittees. These orders are bilateral agreements that
bind both parties and are enforceable in state courts. In the past, DEQ has incorporated
stipulated penalties into special orders so that violations of compliance schedules set out in a
special order subject the permittee to civil penalties specified in the special orders. See, e.g.,
Letter from John R. Butcher, Virginia Assistant Attorney General, to Thomas L. Hopkins,
Director, DEQ 2 (Oct. 1, 1996) [hereinafter Butcher Letter] (noting the incorporation of
stipulated penalties in a consent decree entered into with the City of Petersburg). None of
the Smithfield Special Orders included a stipulated penalty provision.
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relaxing permit conditions without following the procedural requirements
mandated by EPA regulations and the terms of the Memorandum of
Understanding-most importantly, without seeking EPA approval.
i. The TKN Limitation
On May 13, 1986, the day that it issued the 1986 Permit to
Smithfield, the SWCB entered a Special Order that "relaxed" the TKN
limitation in the 1986 Permit for an indeterminate "interim" period." 9 In
return for this "relaxed" limitation, Smithfield agreed to submit additional
water quality data on the Pagan River by March 31, 1987.20 This data
would allow the Board to determine whether the more stringent TKN
limitation in the 1986 Permit should be reinstated by an amendment to the
Special Order.'
Smithfield did not submit the water quality data by March 31,
1997, or any time that year. On January 25, 1988, almost nine months
after Smithfield failed to meet the first data submission deadline, the
Board entered into a second Special Order granting Smithfield an
extension until October 1, 1988, to submit the required data.2 2  This
Special Order also established a compliance schedule for Smithfield if the
Board later determined that Smithfield must comply with a TKN effluent
limitation more stringent than the interim limitation. 123
In a March 1990 Special Order, the Board acknowledged receipt of
Smithfield's water quality data and agreed to provide Smithfield with a
, 9 See 1986 SPECIAL ORDER, supra note 98, at 1. The district court later held that the
Special Orders entered into by the Board and Smithfield did not actually revise any effluent
limitations in the 1986 or 1992 Permits because such revisions did not comply with the
modification procedures set out in EPA regulations. See United States v. Smithfield Foods,
Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769, 790 (E.D. Va. 1997). See also supra note 101 and accompanying
text (describing the federal requirements for the DEQ Director should he wish to modify a
VPDES permit).
'20 See 1986 SPECIAL ORDER, supra note 98, at 1.
,,. See id. The TKN limitation in the 1986 Permit was based on a mathematical model that
derived a more stringent limitation than was present in Smithfield's previous permits. See
id.
'
22 See STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD, COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, AMENDMENT TO A
SPECIAL ORDER ISSUED TO SMITHFIELD FOODS, INC. app. A (1988) (on file with the WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.).
23 See id. The schedule would require compliance with such more stringent limitation
within seventeen months of the Board's determination that a more stringent limitation was
attainable. See id.
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proposed revised TKN effluent limitation by the following November. 124
Pending permit re-issuance-Smithfield's permit was due to expire in
May 1991M'2 -the Board directed Smithfield to comply with the interim
TKN limitation. 26 When the Board addressed this issue in a May 1991
Special Order, it extended the interim TKN limitation until Smithfield
either connected to the HRSD water treatment system or completed an
upgrade of its water treatment facilities. 27 Because Smithfield later chose
to connect to HRSD, 21 the effect of these Special Orders was to grant
Smithfield an exemption from a Virginia enforcement action for
noncompliance with the TKN limitation in the 1986 and 1992 Permits for
the entire period from May 1986-the date of issuance of the 1986
Permit-until Smithfield completed its connection to HRSD in August
1997, as long as Smithfield complied with the lower interim TKN
limitation.
Although these Special Orders did not modify the permit or bind
EPA to their terms, 2 1 Smithfield and Virginia may have expected them to
serve as de facto permit modifications. By the late 1980s, direct
enforcement by EPA in approved states had all but ceased. 3 Moreover,
in Virginia, EPA had not overfiled in federal court in the ten-year period
prior to 1991. " Therefore, when Virginia agreed not to enforce the TKN
effluent limitation in Smithfield's permits, both parties may have expected
that EPA would not enforce this limitation.
124 See STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD, COMMONWEALTH OF VA., A SPECIAL ORDER
ISSUED TO SMITHFIELD FOODS, INC. 2 (1990) [hereinafter MARCH 1990 SPECIAL ORDER]
(on file with the WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.).
125 See id. at 1.
'
26 See id. at 2.
127 See STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD, COMMONWEALTH OF VA., A SPECIAL ORDER
ISSUED TO SMITHFIELD FOODS, INC. app. A (1991) [hereinafter MAY 1991 SPECIAL ORDER](on file with the WM & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.). See also infra notes 147-150 and
accompanying text (discussing Smithfield's options under the May 1991 Special Order).
As provided by this Special Order, the Board required Smithfield to finish upgrading its
facilities-if Smithfield chose this route-according to a schedule of unspecified duration to
be devised by Smithfield, subject to Board approval. See ifr-a note 150 and accompanying
text. This option, therefore, allowed Smithfield to extend application of the interim TKN
limitation largely at its own whim.
'
28 See infira note 152 and accompanying text.
'
29 See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769, 788-89 (E.D. Va. 1997).
'
3o See Senate "Forceless Enforcement" Hearing, supra note 71, at 113 (statement of David
S. Bailey, Director, Virginia Office, Environmental Defense Fund).
,' See Bailey Letter, supra note 71, at 3, reprinted in Senate "Forceless Enforcement"
Hearing, supra note 71, at 249.
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ii. The Phosphorous Limitation
On January 4, 1990, the Board amended the 1986 Permit to include
an effluent limitation for phosphorous and a three-year compliance
schedule. 32  At the time of the permit modification, Smithfield had a
pending lawsuit in state court in which it was challenging the
reasonableness of the phosphorous limitation. 33 After the Board proposed
modifying its permit, Smithfield threatened to move its operations to
North Carolina, which Smithfield contended would not require permittees
to comply with a phosphorous limitation. 34
Shortly thereafter, in March 1990, the Board entered into a Special
Order with Smithfield that settled this dispute. 35 Under this agreement,
the Board agreed to "defer commencement"' 3 6 of the compliance schedule
until December 1, 1990.' In return, Smithfield agreed to study the
available technologies and costs involved in complying with the
phosphorous limitation, study the feasibility of connecting its wastewater
system to the HRSD system, and notify the Board whether it intended to
connect to HRSD by November 13, 1990.138
The district court found that this Special Order deferred
commencement of the compliance schedule but did not extend the January
4, 1993 deadline for compliance with the phosphorous limitation.'39 The
court relied primarily on language in the Special Order stating that
"Smithfield is further required to attain full compliance with the
phosphorous limitation by January 4, 1993.,,140 Although at first glance
this language appears unambiguously to support the court's finding, an
alternative interpretation of the Special Order is that it purported to defer
the entire compliance schedule enumerated in the 1990 modified permit,
including the final compliance deadline. First, the language of the Special
Order quoted by the court arises in the context of a description of the terms
'12 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
' See Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 774.
'14 See Smithfield Plants May Relocate to N.C., RICHMOND NEWS LEADER, Dec. 30, 1989,
at 27. Smithfield employed 3000 workers at its two plants in Smithfield and was one of the
two largest employers in Isle of Wight County at the time. See id.
' See MARCH 1990 SPECIAL ORDER, supra note 124, at 1; Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 774.
As a result, the Isle of Wight Circuit Court dismissed Smithfield's action on April 1, 1991.
See id. at 775 n.6.
136 MARCH 1990 SPECIAL ORDER, supra note 124, at 2.
S37 see id.
'3 See id. at 1-2.
'3' See Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 775 n.4.
'
40 Id. at 774 (quoting MARCH 1990 SPECIAL ORDER, supra note 124, at 1).
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of the 1990 modified permit and merely paraphrases the terms of the
modified permit. 4' Once this statement is placed in context, the Board's
deferral of the commencement of the compliance schedule is most
logically interpreted as a deferral of the entire schedule.'42 Moreover,
there is no mention in the Special Order that Smithfield was subject to a
compressed compliance schedule, or how such a compressed schedule
would operate.
A reasonable interpretation of the March 1990 Special Order is that
the state and Smithfield used it to attempt to defer compliance with the
phosphorous effluent limitation by almost eleven months, i.e., until
November 1, 1993.13 Of course, as the district court later held, the
Special Orders did not modify any of Smithfield's permits, and therefore
could not extend the compliance schedule.'" Instead, the March 1990
Special Order served merely as an eleven-month waiver by Virginia of its
ability to enforce compliance with the phosphorous compliance schedule
in the 1990 modified permit.
In November 1990, the Board entered into another Special Order
that deferred commencement of the phosphorous compliance schedule by
an additional four months, to March 1, 1991.14' Again, it appears that the
Special Order was an attempt to exempt Smithfield from complying with
the phosphorous limitation for a further four months, until March 1, 1994.
Finally, in the May 1991 Special Order, Virginia gave Smithfield
the option of either avoiding compliance with the phosphorous limitation
entirely or extending its exemption from compliance for an additional
period of time. 146 The Special Order directed Smithfield to decide whether
to connect to HRSD or to upgrade its wastewater treatment facilities and
thereby comply with the phosphorous limitation. 14 Under the first option,
Virginia agreed never to enforce compliance with the phosphorous
141 See MARCH 1990 SPECIAL ORDER, supra note 124, at 1.
4 Note, for example, that the Board fixed the milestones in the compliance schedule in
reference to the date of the permit rather than by establishing specific dates for each
milestone. See id.
14 See Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 774. The original construction schedule commenced on
January 4, 1990. See id. The revised schedule commenced on November 1, 1990. See
MARCH 1990 SPECIAL ORDER, supra note 124, at 2.
14 See Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 790.
141 See STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD, COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, AN AMENDMENT
TO A SPECIAL ORDER ISSUED TO SMITHFIELD FOODS, INC. 1 (1990) [hereinafter NOVEMBER
1990 SPECIAL ORDER] (on file with the WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.).
146 See MAY 1991 SPECIAL ORDER, supra note 127, at 2.
147 See id.
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limitation.'48 If Smithfield elected the second option, the Special Order
required it to submit an "approvable schedule"'49 for upgrading its
treatment facilities to comply with the permit effluent limitations by
August 15, 1991.15' The Special Order provided no further direction
regarding what would be an approvable schedule. By its own ambiguous
terms, this requirement deferred compliance with the phosphorous
limitation until after a deadline that Smithfield could itself propose. At the
very least therefore, the May 1991 Special Order effectively waived
enforcement by Virginia of the phosphorous limitation until a time to be
chosen by Smithfield.' 5' However, if Smithfield elected to connect its
treatment facilities to HRSD this Special Order would waive Virginia
enforcement indefinitely.
On June 7, 1991, Smithfield notified the Board of its decision to
connect to HRSD and consequently ceased any attempt to comply with the
phosphorous limitation by upgrading its wastewater treatment facilities.5 2
Between December 1991 and February 1997, wastewater discharged from
Smithfield's two processing plants exceeded the phosphorous limitation in
more than two-thirds of these months and violations exceeded the
148 The district court interpreted the language of the Special Order to require Smithfield to
comply with the phosphorous limitation even if it decided to connect to HRSD. See
Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 785-87. The opposite conclusion is a more reasonable
interpretation. First, if Smithfield agreed to connect to HRSD rather than upgrade its
treatment facilities, it would be impossible for Smithfield to comply with the phosphorous
limitation. If this were the case, this option would not be viable-it would expose
Smithfield to enormous civil penalties without any countervailing benefit. Yet Smithfield
elected to connect to HRSD. See id. at 775. Furthermore, the bill of complaint filed by
Virginia in its lawsuit against Smithfield did not allege noncompliance with the
phosphorous limitation, even though Smithfield violated this condition of its permit more
than any other effluent limitation. See Bill of Particulars, Hopkins v. Smithfield Foods, Inc.
(Isle of Wight Cir. Ct. Mar. 24, 1997) [hereinafter Bill of Particulars]. Clearly, DEQ
believed that Smithfield's election to connect to HRSD exempted it from compliance with
the phosphorous limitation.
149 MAY 1991 SPECIAL ORDER, supra note 127, at 2.
150 See id.
'-5' Moreover, the May 1991 Special Order extended the deadline for Smithfield's
notification to the Board regarding whether it would connect to HRSD for the second time.
The March 1990 Special Order set a deadline of November 13, 1990. See MARCH 1990
SPECIAL ORDER, supra note 124, at 2. A week before this deadline, the Board granted an
extension until February 15, 1991. See NOVEMBER 1990 SPECIAL ORDER, supra note 145,
at 1. The May 1991 Special Order further extended this deadline by an additional four
months, to June 15, 1991. See MAY 1991 SPECIAL ORDER, supra note 127, at 2.
152 See Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 775-76.
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phosphorous limitation by 1055% on average.1 3 Under the terms of the
May 1991 Special Order, Virginia agreed to turn a blind eye to these
permit violations.
iii. The Cyanide, CBOD, and Ammonia Limitations
In a similar manner, Virginia waived its right to enforce
compliance with the effluent limitations in the 1992 Permit for cyanide,
CBOD, and ammonia by Special Order. The 1992 Permit incorporated
these limitations and a construction schedule for improvements to the
Smithfield treatment facilities that would enable Smithfield to comply
with them." 4 The schedule required Smithfield to achieve full compliance
with the new effluent limitations by May 13, 1994.) 5 Smithfield failed to
comply with this deadline because it decided to connect to the HRSD
system rather than upgrade its treatment facilities as required by the 1992
Permit.5 6 After it became clear that Smithfield was in violation of these
effluent limitations and would not comply as long as Smithfield
discharged wastewater directly into the Pagan River, a practice that was
expected to continue for several more years until Smithfield connected to
HRSD, 1 7 DEQ enforcement personnel prepared an Enforcement Action
Recommendation which proposed amending the May 1991 Special Order
to "exempt [Smithfield] from meeting these limits until they go off line to
HRSD."'5 8 The Recommendation argued that the cost to Smithfield of
upgrading its treatment plant would be "prohibitive considering that the
discharge will be going to HRSD in two years."'5 9
.
53 See Smithfield, 972 F. Supp. at 343-44.
114 See Sinitlfield, 965 F. Supp. at 777.
155 See id.
56 See id. at 787; DEP'T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, COMMONWEALTH OF VA., ENFORCEMENT
ACTION RECOMMENDATION FOR SMITHFIELD FOODS, INC. 1 (1994) [hereinafter
ENFORCEMENT ACTION RECOMMENDATION] (on file with the WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y REV.). This Recommendation noted that Smithfield "informed [DEQ] they would
meet these limits by connecting to HRSD and we concurred. At the time (May, 1992),
[DEQ] did not realize that the HRSD force main would take so long to complete." Id.
"' See ENFORCEMENT ACTION RECOMMENDATION, supra note 156, at 1. DEQ noted that
Smithfield "will probably go on-line to HRSD sometime between April, 1996 and February,
1997." Id. This estimate was somewhat optimistic considering that the original completion
date for the upgrade of the HRSD system, which was required before Smithfield could
complete its connection to the system, was December 1996. See Snitfield, 965 F. Supp. at
778. HRSD extended this completion date on several occasions. See id.
"' ENFORCEMENT ACTION RECOMMENDATION, supra note 156, at 1.
159 id.
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In November 1994, the Board entered into a Special Order that
adopted the enforcement action proposed by the DEQ Recommendation. 6 '
In this Special Order, the Board stated that it agreed "to hold in
abeyance"'' the provision in the 1992 Permit which required Smithfield to
comply with these effluent limitations by May 13, 1994.162 Of course,
following this 1994 Special Order, Smithfield ceased attempting to
comply with these limitations and continued to discharge effluent that
violated these permit limitations. 163 But under the Special Order, Virginia
agreed to ignore these violations, regardless of the environmental harm
caused by such permit violations and without specifying any deadline for
connection of the Smithfield plants to the HRSD system."64
In sum, by granting Smithfield virtual immunity from state
enforcement actions for violations of the TKN, phosphorous, cyanide,
CBOD, and ammonia limitations, Virginia's use of Special Orders
significantly contributed to Smithfield's ongoing practice of violating
effluent limitations in its permits. Given these Special Orders and the
seemingly remote possibility of direct EPA enforcement, it is no surprise
that Smithfield assumed that it could violate these limitations without
liability and acted accordingly.
b. Notices of Violation
Virginia's pattern of issuing NOVs also reflected a practice of lax
enforcement. Although Virginia's Special Orders attempted to reduce the
160 SeeSTATE WATER CONTROL BOARD, COMMONWEALTH OF VA., AN AMENDMENT TO A
SPECIAL ORDER ISSUED TO SMITHFIELD FOODS, INC. 1 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 SPECIAL
ORDER] (on file with the WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.).
161 Id.
162 See id. The Special Order noted that Smithfield had agreed to connect to HRSD and that
such connection would achieve compliance with the three effluent limitations. See id. The
rationale for holding these effluent limitations in abeyance appears to have been that,
because Smithfield had committed to the expense of connecting to HRSD, it should not also
be required to incur the expense of upgrading its treatment facilities. See ENFORCEMENT
ACTION RECOMMENDATION, supra note 156, at 1. As the district court later noted,
however, Virginia did not have the authority to grant Smithfield an exemption from
compliance with these effluent limitations without following the modification procedures
prescribed by EPA. See Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 790.
163 See Smitlfeld, 972 F. Supp. at 344, 350-51.
'4 See 1994 SPECIAL ORDER, sutpra note 160, at 1-2. The Special Order also declared that
Smithfield was no longer required to conduct additional toxicity testing of its wastewater, as
required by the 1992 Permit. See id. at 2. The Board granted this concession even though it
acknowledged that the discharge from Smithfield's processing plants had been found to be
toxic. See id. at 1.
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possibility of noncompliance'65 by eliminating the requirements for
compliance with permit effluent limitations for five pollutants-TKN,
phosphorous, cyanide, CBOD, and ammonia-the company failed to
consistently comply with the remaining effluent limitations in its permit or
the "interim" TKN limitation. Between September 1994 and March 1996,
DEQ issued nine NOVs to Smithfield, citing violations of permit effluent
limitations for oil and grease, fecal coliform, BOD, TSS, and pH, as well
as the "interim" TKN limitation adopted in the 1986 Special Order.' 66
DEQ issued six NOVs in successive months from September 1994
through February 1995.167 Despite this record of repeated noncompliance,
Virginia never negotiated a civil penalty with the company as a result of
these violations. 68
DEQ's practice of issuing NOVs to Smithfield in response to
repeated permit violations failed to bring the company into compliance
with the conditions of its permit. With no civil penalty attached to the
NOV, and the unlikelihood of enforcement for violations, Smithfield
decided not to upgrade its facilities and therefore, continued to violate its
permit. The Special Orders exempted Smithfield from complying with
165 That is, noncompliance with the 1992 Permit, as "modified" by the Board's Special
Orders. Virginia did not consider noncompliance with the conditions of the 1992 Permit to
be noncompliance, as long as Smithfield complied with the terms of the Special Orders. Cf
Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 778 (noting that Smithfield's repeated violations of its 1992
Permit did not appear on any QNCR prior to 1994 because "Virginia issued consent orders
allowing defendants to exceed the limits established in the Permit").
'" See Letter from Francis L. Daniel, Director, Tidewater Regional Office, DEQ, to Carl B.
Wood, Vice President of Engineering, Smithfield Foods, Inc. 1 (Apr. 8, 1996) (on file with
the WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.) [hereinafter April 1996 Daniel Letter]. The
Board issued at least one NOV to Smithfield prior to September 1994: In May 1991, the
Board issued a NOV for a violation resulting from a "lagoon failure." Memorandum from
David S. Gussman, Senior Enforcement Specialist, Tidewater Regional Office, DEQ, to
Harold J. Winer, Compliance and Monitoring Manager, Tidewater Regional Office, DEQ 1(Apr. 24, 1996) [hereinafter April 1996 Daniel Letter] (on file with the WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.).
'
67 See id.
168 The court noted a lack of any evidence that Smithfield had ever paid an administrative
civil penalty for any of its permit violations, see Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 791 n.32, and
that none of the Board's Special Orders ever assessed a civil penalty against the company.
See id at 792 n.33. But see ENFORCEMENT RECOMMENDATION PLAN, supra note 116, at
app. E ("The State Water Control Board agreed to the payment of a $100 Civil penalty and
a $25,000 contribution to the oil spill emergency fund for violations of the interim limits at
Smithfield Packing.").
Prior to July 1, 1996 DEQ did not have authority to assess civil penalties
without the consent of the permittee. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
five effluent limitations in the permit and DEQ had demonstrated no signs
of taking any significant enforcement action with regard to violations of
the other effluent limitations.'69
c. Virginia 's Civil Action Against Smithfield
i. DEQ's Decision to Enforce the 1992 Permit
The prospect of stronger enforcement by DEQ did not finally
become apparent until the spring of 1996, as a result of pressure by EPA
for a tougher action. 7 The problems at Smithfield had come to the
attention of EPA after DEQ reported Smithfield to be in significant
noncompliance with its permit in 1994.'17 From that time onward, EPA
began to track Virginia's enforcement actions to bring Smithfield into
compliance.'72 As Smithfield continued to violate its permit and DEQ
repeatedly issued ineffective NOVs, EPA pressured DEQ to justify its
weak enforcement response. 73 After DEQ was forced to issue its ninth
NOV in less than two years in March 1996,"74 DEQ's Tidewater Regional
Office (TRO) finally decided to initiate stronger action. On April 8, 1996,
the Director of the TRO informed Smithfield that it intended to
recommend that the Board "consider requesting" a referral to the OAG to
initiate a civil suit against the company at the Board's May 22, 1996,
meeting. 7 At about the same time, a TRO enforcement specialist
prepared an Enforcement Recommendation Plan (ERP) recommending
that the Board negotiate a Special Order with Smithfield imposing a civil
penalty of $278,279.76 This recommendation was based on evidence
acquired by DEQ that Smithfield had committed perhaps hundreds of
169 See Smithiield, 965 F. Supp. at 773-78.
170 See id. at 779.
'7' See id. at 778. For a discussion of the term "significant noncompliance," see supra notes
74-75 and accompanying text.
172 See Smitlfield, 965 F. Supp. at 779.
7 3 See Memorandum from Amy Clarke, Water Division, DEQ, to Thomas Hopkins, Deputy
Secretary of Natural Resources, Commonwealth of Virginia 1 (June 20, 1995) (on file with
the WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.). Clarke noted that in a recent meeting with
EPA compliance staff, DEQ enforcement staff "defended [their] efforts to cooperate
constructively with [Smithfield] to solve their problems." Id. At the time of this
memorandum, DOJ was investigating a possible criminal prosecution of Terry Rettig,
Smithfield's former treatment plant operator. See id. at 2.
'4 See April 1996 Daniel Letter, supra note 166, at 1.
,
75 See id. at 2.
17 6 See ENFORCEMENT RECOMMENDATION PLAN, supra note 116, at 1.
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permit violations in the preceding two years. An appendix to the ERP
noted that Smithfield had committed fifty-nine violations of effluent
limitations (that were enforceable by Virginia),' had committed
violations of groundwater standards (and continued to violate such
standards),'78 and had failed to comply with permit requirements for
sampling and analysis, recording of analytical results, record-keeping,
reporting, operation of the treatment facility, and quality control.'79 The
effluent violations alone were equivalent to 175 days of violation, which
subjected Smithfield to a maximum statutory civil penalty of
$4,375,000.8°
ii. DEQ's Change of Heart
At the beginning of May, however, DEQ enforcement officials in
the Richmond headquarters overruled the TRO's recommendation by
issuing a Revised ERP which recommended that no penalty should be
assessed against Smithfield. 8' The Revised ERP based this conclusion on
several grounds. First, and most important, it stated that "absent express
reservation of claims, all known claims predating DEQ's execution of the
most recent consent order (11/8/94) are merged into the settlement and, in
effect, discharged."'82  This legal conclusion reflected the opinion of
Virginia Assistant Attorney General John Butcher.'83 On the basis of this
opinion, DEQ believed that any enforcement action had to be justified
solely by violations after November 8, 1994.84
The November 1994 Special Order, however, did not exempt
Smithfield from liability from all violations prior to the Order. The Order
addresses Smithfield's failure to comply with only the cyanide, CBOD,
177 See id. app. D. As noted above, the Board had agreed in a series of Special Orders not to
hold Smithfield liable for violations of the phosphorous, TKN, cyanide, CBOD, and
ammonia effluent limitations in the 1992 Permit. See supra note 118 and accompanying
text.
178 See ENFORCEMENT RECOMMENDATION PLAN, supra note 116, app. D.
179 See id.
180 See id. app. C. Appendix C provides an itemized accounting of maximum statutory
penalties but erroneously totals the penalty to $4,037,500. See id.
..2 See Memorandum from Amy Clarke, Water Division, DEQ, to Harry Kelso, Director,
Enforcement Division, DEQ 2 (May 2, 1996) [hereinafter Revised ERP] (on file with the
WM & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.).
282 Id. at 1.
183 See id.
284 See id.
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and ammonia limitations, but nothing more.' Even if the Special Order
waived Virginia's right to seek civil penalties for noncompliance with
these three permit limitations prior to the date of the Order, no provision
of the Order either expressly or implicitly can be interpreted to extend this
waiver to other permit violations. A provision of the Special Order
suggests that the contrary is true: "Both the Board and Smithfield
understand and agree that this amendment does not alter, modify, or
amend any other term or condition of the [May 1991] Order or of the
Permit except as specified above."' 86  If Virginia wanted to seek civil
penalties for past violations of other permit conditions, contrary to
Assistant Attorney General Butcher's conclusion, it could have.
Second, the Revised ERP concluded, as a matter of enforcement
policy, that Virginia could not proceed against Smithfield in light of its
agreement to connect to the HRSD system: "All efforts to date, by
Smithfield and the State Water Control Board/DEQ, have been in
anticipation of and to facilitate hookup to HRSD. If that fails, then DEQ
can enforce for failure of Smithfield to comply with the 1991 Consent
Order.", 8 7 This policy decision gave Smithfield carte blanche to violate
the conditions of its permit without fear of being subject to an enforcement
action by the state. Such a policy determination is surely contrary to the
letter and the spirit of the CWA and DEQ's enabling statute. 8
Third, the Revised ERP implicitly concluded, again as a matter of
enforcement policy, that the violations since November 1994 did not
warrant enforcement action. 9 Smithfield had violated its permit on at
least eight, and probably as many as eleven, occasions since November
1994; at least six of these violations exceeded the fecal coliform limitation
by 400% or more.' In light of Smithfield's past history of
noncompliance, as evidenced by the requirement for the November 1994
"" See 1994 SPECIAL ORDER, supra note 160, at 1.
116 Id. at 2.
'7 Revised ERP, supra note 181, at 2 (emphasis added).
,8' The CWA provides that, "[e]xcept as in compliance with [an NPDES permit issued in
compliance with the CWA], the discharge of any pollutant by any person is unlawful." See
33 U.S.C. § 1311 (a) (1994). The Virginia statute is just as explicit. It states that one of the
purposes for the creation of DEQ was to "promote environmental quality through ...
expeditious and comprehensive ... enforcement programs." VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1183
(Michie 1998).
189 See Revised ERP, supra note 181, at 1.
o See ENFORCEMENT RECOMMENDATION PLAN, supra note 116, app. C. Three violations
are dated November 1994, but it is unclear whether they pre-dated or post-dated the
November 8, 1994 Special Order. See id. Two of these violations involved violations of
the fecal coliform limitation by 1150%. See id.
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Special Order, these violations justified enforcement action.
At the May 22, 1996 meeting, the Board duly decided not to refer
the matter to OAG or to take any enforcement action, and actually directed
DEQ not to take any enforcement action against Smithfield before the
Board next convened.' 9' Instead, the Board directed DEQ to meet with
Smithfield representatives to try and resolve the matter without resorting
to a formal enforcement action. -9 2 A week after the Board meeting, the
TRO sent a letter to Smithfield noting that the proposed enforcement
action had been "removed ...from the agenda of the May 22, 1996,
meeting of the State Water Control Board."' 93  The letter requested
Smithfield to furnish DEQ with a variety of data and information on their
wastewater treatment operations, including fecal coliform and TKN data
since August 1, 1994, and cost data relating to the operation of, and
improvements to, the treatment plants. 94 Although it did not rule out the
possibility of future enforcement action by the state, neither did the letter
indicate that such action would arise in the future.9 The prospect of any
enforcement action by Virginia appeared to be remote. 9
6
0' See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769, 779 (E.D. Va. 1997)
(quoting the minutes of the Board's meeting).
'
92 See id. (quoting the minutes of the Board's meeting).
'9 Letter from Francis L. Daniel, Director, Tidewater Regional Office, DEQ, to Carl B.
Wood, Vice President of Engineering, Smithfield Foods, Inc. 1 (May 29, 1996) (on file with
the WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.).
'9' See id. at 1-2.
The letter required Smithfield to submit the requested data to DEQ by July 1, 1996. See
id. at 1. DEQ would then "thoroughly evaluate" the information and advise Smithfield of
DEQ's "next course of action." Id. at 2.
..6 Virginia officials later said that the state was unable to take enforcement at the May 1996
Board meeting because DOJ was still investigating its criminal case against the former
manager of Smithfield's water treatment plants. See, e.g., Letter from Becky Norton
Dunlop, Secretary of Natural Resources, Commonwealth of Virginia, to the Editor, The
Washington Post, reprinted in WASH. PoST, Dec. 30, 1997, at A18 ("Once the FBI relaxed
its 'hold' on Virginia's enforcement case, DEQ aggressively resumed its case."). However,
as the discussion in the text demonstrates, DEQ officials decided not to seek a civil penalty
against Smithfield because they believed: (1) the company's violations prior to November
1994 could not be punished; (2) Smithfield's decision to connect to HRSD exempted it
from enforcement action; and (3) the violations after this date did not warrant enforcement
action. See supra notes 181-188 and accompanying text. DEQ would not have invested the
time and money preparing an Enforcement Recommendation Plan, see supra notes 175-180
and accompanying text, nor would it have placed the proposed referral to OAG on the
agenda for the May 22, 1996 Board meeting, if it had believed that a criminal investigation
precluded a state enforcement action. Clearly, this evidence indicates that DEQ had
received notice from EPA or DOJ that it could proceed with its own enforcement action.
Electronic mail correspondence between DEQ staff confirms that this was in fact the case.
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iii. DEQ 's Second Change of Heart
Although the Board's decision was not surprising considering
DEQ's revised determination that a penalty was not warranted, it almost
certainly was a surprise to EPA, and became a factor in EPA's decision in
the summer of 1996 to proceed with a direct enforcement action against
Smithfield. As the district court stated, "[w]hen it became apparent that
the Commonwealth's actions were not resulting in compliance, and the
Commonwealth did not intend to seek a civil penalty for the violations, the
EPA initiated its own enforcement action."' 97 On August 27, 1996, EPA
informed DEQ that it had referred the Smithfield case to the Department
of Justice (DOJ or "Justice") for a civil enforcement action, and invited
Virginia to join in the lawsuit. 98
Virginia reacted quickly to this news. It rejected the invitation to
join the federal action and, just three days after learning of the future
federal suit, filed a civil action against Smithfield in the Isle of Wight
County Circuit Court.' 99 In order to do so, DEQ and OAG circumvented
the established procedures for enforcement matters. DEQ referred the
matter to OAG without preparing a referral file and, most importantly,
without submitting a recommendation for referral to the Board for
approval (as DEQ had initially planned to do at the May 22, 1996 Board
meeting).2 ' No enforcement staff who had worked on the Smithfield case
were consulted; the decision was made by DEQ's Director of Enforcement
in Richmond and his superiors, who were political appointees.20' When
the Chairman of the SWCB later asked why the Board had not been
consulted regarding the referral, Thomas Hopkins, the Director of DEQ,
stated that Virginia acted "to beat the feds" to the courthouse.2°2
One DEQ staff member wrote, "[t]he federal gov't has not renewed its request to hold back
enforcement action against Smithfield Foods, as today by phone. You should feel free to
take any action TRO feels appropriate." Electronic Mail Message from Ralph J. Meyer,
Office of Enforcement and Compliance, DEQ, to Harold J. Winer, Compliance and
Monitoring Manager, Tidewater Regional Office, DEQ (Feb. 26, 1996) (on file with the
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv.).
' United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769, 779 (E.D. Va. 1997) (quoting
Lorraine H. Reynolds, Environmental Scientist, EPA).
198 See id.
199 See id.
200 See JLARC REPORT, supra note 34, at 102-03.
201 See id.
202 Id. at 81; Scott Harper, Smithfield Foods Faces Federal Pollution Lawsuit, VIRGINIAN-
PILOT, Dec. 17, 1996, at Al.
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The history of Virginia's reversal is indisputable. In May 1996,
less than four months prior to the filing of the bill of complaint, senior
DEQ officials -had decided that no enforcement action should be taken in
the Smithfield case.201 "As late as July 1996, the State had shown no
indication of taking enforcement action against [Smithfield], and in fact
had indicated that the State did not consider enforcement action
necessary.",2' By the end of August 1996, however, DEQ believed the
need for an enforcement action was so urgent that it justified abandoning
the standard procedure of seeking Board approval of a referral to OAG.
Yet, in the intervening four-month period, there had been no violations of
Smithfield's permit limitations that could justify this reversal. °5
Simply put, Virginia's decision to sue Smithfield was a political
decision. Having learned that a federal suit was forthcoming, Virginia
decided that it wanted to get to court before DOJ. 206 Virginia had several
possible motivations for its action. Perhaps foremost, Virginia likely
expected a state civil action to cause EPA to abandon its direct
enforcement action.20 7 Virginia had achieved this result on at least two
prior occasions.0 8 Virginia may also have been motivated by a desire to
improve public perception of its enforcement record even if it could not
preclude a federal lawsuit. If Smithfield was going to be sued for CWA
violations, which appeared to be inevitable after EPA's announcement on
August 27, 1996, Virginia could at least reap some political advantage by
203 See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
204 JLARC REPORT, supra note 34, at 93.
20. See Bill of Particulars, supra note 148, at exhibit 1.
206 Of course, these actions would be filed in different courts: Virginia's civil action was
filed in the Isle of Wight County Circuit Court; the federal civil case was filed in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.
207 See Letter from W. Michael McCabe, Region III Administrator, U. S. Environmental
Protection Agency, to Thomas C. Hopkins, Director, DEQ 2-3 (Sept. 19, 1996) [hereinafter
McCabe Letter]. McCabe stated that "a quick action was taken by the Commonwealth in an
attempt to block the federal process." Id.
208 In three cases prior to Smithfield, EPA had announced that it intended to take direct
enforcement action against municipalities that had repeatedly violated CWA permits
without any enforcement response by Virginia. See id. The three municipalities involved
were the City of Petersburg, Clifton Forge, and the Town of South Hill. See id. On each
occasion, Virginia had initiated an enforcement action upon receiving notice from EPA.
See id. Moreover, "in each action the Commonwealth made it clear that its motive in
pursuing the actions was to forestall federal enforcement." Id. In two of these cases
(Clifton Forge and City of Petersburg), EPA decided not to pursue an enforcement action
out of deference to Virginia's primary enforcement authority. See Butcher Interview, supra
note 116. Cf Butcher Letter, supra note 118, at 2-4 (discussing the three cases and noting
that EPA recovered an administrative penalty from the Town of South-Hill).
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being seen to take the lead in the case. Whatever Virginia's motivation, it
certainly was not motivated by a desire to recover a high civil penalty
from Smithfield that would have a deterrent effect on the regulated
community.
iv. Hopkins v. Smithfield Foods, Inc.2 19
From the outset of the state lawsuit, Virginia demonstrated its
unwillingness to recover a significant penalty from Smithfield. The bill of
particulars filed by Virginia to support its bill of complaint listed seventy-
two "items" of violation of Smithfield's permits .2 " Although not specified
in this document, Virginia officials stated that these seventy-two "items"
corresponded to 22,520 permit violations by Smithfield since May 1986.2 1
In this ongoing suit, Smithfield is therefore subject to a maximum
statutory civil penalty of $563 million. Yet, Virginia only sought a
penalty in the "'three-quarters of a million to $2 million range,' . "13 even
though Smithfield has a twenty-year history of permit violations." 4
Moreover, Virginia officials have expressed a desire to settle the case,
presumably for a stipulated penalty less than this amount.2 15  Despite
Virginia's intention of reaching settlement, settlement negotiations failed
and the case is still pending.1 6
Virginia's lack of genuine desire to obtain a civil penalty against
Smithfield may be reflected in the way in which it has conducted this
209 Hopkins v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., No. 96-125, (Isle of Wight Cir. Ct. Mar. 24, 1997)
2
"' See Bill of Particulars, supra note 148, at exhibit 1.
211 See Virginia Drops Lawsuit Against Smithfield Foods, WASH. POsT, July 10, 1997, at
D6. Unlike the federal government, Virginia is not limited by a five-year statute of
limitations in civil actions enforcing the CWA. See Butcher Interview, supra note 116. See
also 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1994) (stating that a five-year statute of limitations applies to federal
civil actions to recover penalties); supra note 107 (discussing the application of 28 U.S.C. §
2462 to the CWA).
22 Virginia law subjects a permittee to a civil penalty "not to exceed $25,000 for each
violation." VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.32(a) (Michie 1998).
2"3 Stradling, supra note 115, at Al (quoting Michael McKenna, Director of Policy and
Planning, DEQ). In Smithfield, the United States sought to recover the maximum statutory
penalty available-$ 125 million-in light of the five-year statute of limitations that applied
to the federal action. See Nakashima & Hsu, supra note 107, at B1. It obtained a civil
penalty for only roughly 10% of that amount-S12.6 million. See United States v.
Smithfield Foods, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 338, 354 (E.D. Va. 1997).
21 4 See ENFORCEMENT RECOMMENDATION PLAN, supra note 116, app. E.
21 5 See Scott Harper, Va. Sues Smithfield Foods Over Polluting, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Aug. 31,
1996, at D1.
26 See Butcher Interview, supra note 116.
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lawsuit to date. First, the bill of complaint filed on August 30, 1996,
omitted allegations of late or inaccurate reporting and contained several
inaccurate factual allegations.2"7 The Commonwealth had to file an
amended bill of complaint on September 20, 1996 that corrected these
deficiencies. 18
Second, on July 9, 1997-only three days into the trial-Virginia
was forced to file for a nonsuit, which voluntarily dismissed the case, after
the judge ruled that one of the state's expert witnesses could not testify
about material included in an amended version of his report that Virginia
filed only four days prior to trial.2 9 As a result, Virginia refiled its bill of
complaint a few days later and began the lawsuit anew.220
Virginia's stated objectives for the lawsuit and OAG's litigation
errors cast doubt on the seriousness with which the state is pursuing its
civil action against Smithfield.
V. SYSTEMIC UNDER-ENFORCEMENT BY VIRGINIA
A. Examples of Virginia 's Failure to Enforce Permits
Smithfield is only one of a group of chronic polluters that the state
has failed to effectively control. The state's long-standing policy has been
one of conciliation rather than formal action to ensure compliance.12 Its
failure to severely punish other polluters illustrates that the state's actions
vis-a-vis Smithfield's violations are the norm. One example of another
polluter that the state handled with kid gloves is Allied Signal.
1. Allied Signal
Allied Signal is a chemical company with facilities in both
Hopewell and Chesterfield, Virginia. On various occasions, Allied has
released significant amounts of chemicals into Virginia's waters. Between
1989 and 1991, it was responsible for at least three chemical spills that
caused fish kills in the James River. These spills included sulfuric acid,
phenol, and cyclohexanone. -- For these three serious spills, the SWCB
217 See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769, 779 (E.D. Va. 1997).
218 See id.
219 See Virginia Drops Lawsuit Against Smithfield Foods, supra note 211, at D6.
220 See Stradling, supra note 117, at C1-2.
22' See MLARC REPORT, supra note 34, at 75.
222 See id. at 91.
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negotiated a fine of only $46,000.223
Allied continued to damage the state's waters with near impunity.
Between- August 1992 and January 1996, Allied violated its permits by
spilling a total of 43,224 pounds of sulfuric acid, 13,350 pounds of
ammonia, and 15,410 pounds of cyclohexanone. 24 The ammonia spills
did not reach state waters, but three of the acid spills and the
cyclohexanone made their way into a feeder stream and thence into the
James River.225 Virginia took no enforcement action and imposed no fines
for these spills.2
26
In March and April of 1996 the company was responsible for two
more acid spills totaling 13,350 pounds. These spills caused fish kills of
at least 2200 fish.227  In response to these spills DEQ initiated an
enforcement action and proposed a $25,000 fine at the next meeting of the
SWCB.228 The same spills caused EPA to propose a civil penalty of
$125,000, the maximum available under section 309(g)(2).229
However, the State entered into a consent agreement with Allied
four days before the SWCB had its meeting and three days after EPA had
mailed a letter to Allied proposing the much higher fine. 3' Because of the
nature of the CWA, state action can sometimes function to "preempt"
federal action, 2 and the EPA suggested that the state had acted quickly in
this situation in order to undermine the federal agency's ability to levy a
fine.232 EPA argued that Virginia was "attempting to shield two violators
from legitimate federal enforcement."23 3  Despite the State's apparent
attempt to protect Allied from the EPA, Leonard Nash of EPA Region III
reported that the company paid the federal fine of $125,000.234
The history of DEQ's failure to seriously pursue enforcement in
the Allied case illustrates how the State's lax enforcement may reduce
industrial dischargers' incentive to comply with permit limitations, at the
expense of Virginia's water resources. Consistent enforcement of permits
would prompt measures to ensure fewer violations.
223 See id.
224 See id.
225 See id.
226 See id.
227 See id.
228 See id. at 94.
229 See id. at 91, 94.
230 See id. at 91.
231 See id at 93.
232 See id. at 94.
233 McCabe Letter, supra note 207, at 3.
234 See Nash Interview, supra note 74.
548 [Vol. 23:513
1999] UNITED STATES V. SMITHFIELD: LAX ENFORCEMENT
2. Avtex Fibers
Avtex Fibers was a rayon manufacturing facility in Front Royal,
Virginia, and another chronic violator of its discharge permits. Over a
period of nine years, from 1980 to 1989, Avtex violated its permits more
than 1600 times.235  The company finally filed for bankruptcy, but not
before it seriously damaged Virginia's environment with PCBs, zinc,
carbon disulfide, and lead.236
As early as 1986 EPA had knowledge that PCBs were being
mishandled at the Avtex site.237 That year EPA added the site to the
Superfund National Priorities List238 and signed a consent decree with
Avtex that required it to perform extensive investigation into the toxicity
of materials held in on-site disposal bins.239
Not until November 1988, eight years after Avtex began violating
its permits did Virginia take any significant enforcement action by suing
Avtex for more than 2000 water and air permit violations, seeking $19.6
million in fines. 4 On January 17, 1989, the SWCB obtained a settlement
for $2 million24" ' and a court order requiring Avtex to create a $5.7 million
trust fund to cover plant repairs and cleanup costs. 2412  However, Avtex
continued to violate its permits,243 forcing the SWCB to seek two separate
contempt orders against the company.2 4 In July 1989 the court imposed a
23' See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT PENALTIES
MAY NOT RECOVER ECONOMIC BENEFITS GAINED BY VIOLATORS 7 (1991) [hereinafter
GAO REPORT, ECONOMIC BENEFITS].
236 See id.
2" See Robert LaRussa, Avtex Hit with Suit Over PCBs, DAILY NEWS RECORD, Aug. 30,
1989, at 2.
211 See Cass Peterson, Supeifund Bill Stalls; EPA Adds 244 Sites to Priority-Cleanup,
List, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 1984.
211 See Court Holds Federal Government Liable for Cleanup Costs at Virginia Rayon
Plant, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2431 (Feb. 28, 1992).
240 See Laura M. Litvan, Avtex to Remain Open, Judge Rules, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 28,
1989, at C3.
241 See Virginia Attorney General Comments on Fines, Penalties Imposed on Avtex, U.S.
NEWSWIRE, Nov. 22, 1989.
242 See D'Vera Cohn, Avtex to Pay $7.7 Million for Fines, Repairs; Reopened Front
Royal Firm Settles Environmental, Safety Suits, WASH. POST., Dec. 3, 1988, at BI; Avtex
Agrees to Pay Fines, Cleanup Costs; State to Drop Suit, Allow Plant to Stay Open, 19
Env't Rep. (BNA) 1668 (Dec. 16, 1988).
243 See Todd Smith, Avtex Fined $6 Million for Polluting, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1989,
at C1.
244 See Virginia Attorney General Comments on Fines, Penalties Imposed on Avtex, supra
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suspended fine of $990,000 on Avtex.245
The state also sought to enjoin the company's dumping of PCBs
into the Shenandoah River, and in September 1989, the state moved to
revoke the company's effluent discharge permit.246 The court revoked the
permit in November 47 and imposed additional penalties of $3 million.248
Avtex never paid any of this money, for in February 1990, Avtex filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy, leaving behind millions of dollars in unpaid fines
and cleanup costs. 24 9
Avtex is again illustrative of Virginia's failed policy of conciliation
toward polluters °.2 " Given the seriousness and frequency of the company's
violations, the state should have acted promptly and aggressively instead
of waiting eight years before pursuing any substantial enforcement action.
If the state had promptly pursued and placed economic penalties upon the
company for continued violations of its permits, then Avtex would have
had to either change its practices or close its doors much earlier, thus
greatly reducing the damage to Virginia's environment.
B. Virginia's Enforcement Compares Poorly to Similar States
1. Significant Under-Assessment of Penalties by DEQ
Civil penalties are a vital component of the CWA.2"' They serve at
least three important goals:
note 241.
245 See LaRussa, supra note 237, at 2.
246 See D'Vera Cohn, Avtex Shuts Va Plant; Cleanup Set, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 1989, at
B1.
241 See Robert LaRussa, Virginia Pulls the Plug on Avtex Pernit, WOMEN'S WEAR
DAILY, Nov. 10, 1989, at 19.
248 See Virginia Attorney General Comments on Fines, Penalties hnposed on Avtex, supra
note 241.
249 See GAO REPORT,-ECONOMIC BENEFITS, supra note 235, at 7.
250 Richard Hembra of the U.S. General Accounting Office, cited Avtex as an outstanding
example of failed state enforcement. See EPA's Penalties May Not Recover Economic
Benefits Gained by Violators, Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs,
1991 Legis., Spec. Sess. (1991), reprinted in U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EPA'S
PENALTIES MAY NOT RECOVER ECONOMIC BENEFITS GAINED BY VIOLATORS 5-6 (1991)
(Statement of Richard L. Hembra, Director of Environmental Protection Issues, Resources,
Community, and Economic Development Division, U. S. General Accounting Office).
2" See JLARC REPORT, supra note 34, at 77. See generally U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, POLICY ON CIVIL PENALTIES (1984) (describing the three purposes
of civil penalties: deterrence, fairness to regulated community, and resolution of
environmental problems) [hereinafter EPA PENALTY POLICY].
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1. Deterrence of future violations by eliminating the economic
benefits of non-compliance;
2. Retribution based on the seriousness of the violation, extent of
prior violations, and good-faith efforts to comply with the permits;
and
3. Fair and consistent treatment of regulated industries by
maintaining a competitive balance.25 2
Despite these important functions, the SWCB imposes fines that
are both far fewer in number and of lesser severity than the fines in
Virginia's neighboring states. 3 The JLARC study compared Virginia's
civil penalty assessments with eleven states 254 and found that for the years
1992 through 1996, Virginia assessed the least in civil penalties of any of
the states, approximately $597,000, with one year-1996-going as low
as $4000.255 Mississippi was the next to the lowest with $792,000 in
penalties; even its lowest year-1996-was over eight times that of
Virginia at $33,000. In contrast, Georgia, in the same time period,
assessed over $16 million with its annual figures never dipping below $4
million-a rate 4000 times higher than Virginia's lowest annual figure.25 6
In addition, there has also been a decline in the average fine in Virginia,
from a high of $10,000 in 1992 to below $2000 in 1996.7 Even in
enforcement actions, the state remains reluctant to assess civil penalties.
Of 123 enforcement actions in 1993, the SWCB assessed penalties in only
twenty-eight cases (thirty-four percent), and of 109 actions in 1995, the
SWCB assessed penalties in only six cases (six percent).
The low level of penalty assessment, again, reflects Virginia's
attitude toward industry and enforcement-encouragement rather than
punishment. DEQ's policy is to negotiate consent orders without the use
of civil penalties whenever possible.259 This policy is so entrenched that
252 See GAO REPORT, ECONOMIC BENEFITS, supra note 235, at 3; JLARC REPORT, supra
note 34, at 77.
25' See JLARC REPORT, supra note 34, at 79 tbl. 11.
254 The eleven states surveyed are: Georgia, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Florida,
Tennessee, Alabama, North Carolina, Kentucky, West Virginia, Maryland, and
Mississippi. See id.255 See id.256 See id.
257 See JLARC REPORT, supra note 34, at 77-8.
258 See McCabe Letter, supra note 207, at 1.
259 See John H. Cushman Jr., Virginia Seen as Undercutting US. Environmental Rules, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 19, 1997, at 22.
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the JLARC report suggested that the DEQ's enforcement staff feared that
their jobs would be in danger if they recommended penalties against the
regulated community.2 61
Although Virginia has a relatively low level of reported major
dischargers listed as being in Significant Non-compliance (SNC),26'
Virginia's lack of SNCs does not completely explain the low level of fines
collected. Although the state ranked twelfth in terms of the number of
permitted dischargers in violation, with only twenty, all of those
dischargers violated effluent standards, while in other states SNCs crossed
the spectrum of water violations (i.e. scheduling and reporting
violations).262 For states with effluent violators in SNC, Virginia ranked
twenty-seventh.2 63 Even this poor ranking, however, may be generous to
the Commonwealth. Public interest group research ranked Virginia very
low in every measure of SNC.26
Discrepancies in rankings may stem from differences in
reporting,2 6 and the DEQ's practice of not listing a permittee as being in
SNC if that permittee has entered into an agreement to reduce pollution.
DEQ did not list Smithfield on its SNC list for 1995-96,266 presumably
because the company had agreed to the Special Order the DEQ had issued.
Similarly, DEQ removed Allied Chemical from its 1995 list even though
that company continued to exceed its permit limitations.267
260 See JLARC REPORT, supra note 34, at 82.
261 See GAO REPORT, APPROPRIATE ENFORCEMENT, supra note 26, at 20-21.
262 See id.
263 See id.
264 The U.S. Public Interest Research Group (U.S. PIRG) ranked all fifty states for five
different measures of SNC for the period of January 1995 through March 1996. This
research, based on EPA's Permit Compliance System, an electronic database, shows that
Virginia is ranked 39th in terms of percentage of major facilities in SNC, 26th in terms of
number of industrial facilities in SNC, 36th in terms of percentage of major industrial
facilities in SNC, 27th in terms of number of major municipal facilities in SNC, and 34th
in terms of percentage of major municipal facilities in SNC. See TODD ROBINS, U.S.
PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, DIRTY WATER SCOUNDRELS: STATE-BY-STATE
VIOLATIONS OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT BY THE NATION'S LARGEST FACILITIES app. III
(1997) [hereinafter PIRG REPORT].
265 U.S. PIRG data may have been skewed by Virginia's failure to report all of its data to
EPA's Permit Compliance System. See id. app. V. Virginia's DEQ "affirmatively
contacted PIRG and furnished [supplemental] data . . . derived from the state's own
Quarterly Non-Compliance Reports." Id. This additional data evidently intended to
indicate that Virginia's water program is not as lax as PIRG's rankings would indicate.266 See PIRG REPORT, supra note 264, app. V.
267 See JLARC REPORT, supra note 34, at 91.
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2. Significant Under-Prosecution of Civil Suits in Virginia
Referrals from the DEQ to the OAG have declined sharply in
recent years.268 From the year 1989 in which the DEQ referred thirty cases
to the OAG, there was a steady decline to the years 1995 and 1996, in
which there was a total of one referral. 269 This decline is significant for
various reasons. First it reflects the agency's overly solicitous attitude
toward permitees. Secondly, it illustrates that the lack of a credible threat
of civil litigation limits the agency's ability to negotiate strict fines against
the regulated community. 70 With the exception of Smithfield, the OAG
has been reluctant to litigate environmental cases.217' And as this article
makes clear, it is more likely that political concerns dictated the OAG's
litigation efforts in Smithfield than did a policy shift toward stronger
enforcement.
3. DEQ's Failure to Take Action against Municipalities and State
Agencies
The DEQ's stance on non-compliant municipalities fits the pattern
of its lax enforcement record. Even when municipalities are chronic
violators of their discharge permits, the DEQ avoids enforcement actions
in favor of conciliation.72 The agency has an unwritten rule that only the
most egregious permit violations are to be prosecuted. 73 The JLARC
report noted one instance in which "[a] town ha[d] a long record of
noncompliance with its permit limits. It received a Notice of Violation
almost every month for permit violations between April of 1990 and
December of 1995, ' ' 74 yet by "November 1, 1996, no formal enforcement
action had been taken.
'275
Similarly, DEQ is reluctant to pursue enforcement standards
against other state agencies.2 76 Examples abound. One state facility was
dumping ash from scrubbers into a creek without any permit, and the DEQ
recommended that the facility apply for a permit and that it stop the
2
"
8 See id. at 104.
269 See id.
270 See id.
.71 See id. at 105-6.
272 See id. at 85.
273 See id.
274 Id. at 86.
275 Id.
276 See id. at 106.
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dumping and clean up the creek.27 7 The facility, however, continued its
permitless dumping and subsequently reneged on a compliance agreement.
it signed with DEQ.278 DEQ took no formal action, and instead negotiated
yet another agreement, one that required essentially the same actions that
the non-compliant agency had flaunted in the first place.2 79
Another state agency was in non-compliance because of its
wastewater treatment plant.280 In 1988 the DEQ entered into an agreement
with that agency which required it to "upgrade its wastewater treatment
plant and to construct a pipeline to transport the effluent. ' '28 ' But four
years later, the agency had still not satisfactorily upgraded its facility or
constructed the pipeline.282 DEQ responded by giving it an extension until
1994.283 In August of 1996 the DEQ gave that agency yet another
extension, one that required that the agency be in compliance by 1997.284
Thus, a nine-year period had passed and still the agency remained in non-
compliance.
All of these examples highlight the fact that Virginia's record of
under-enforcement crosses all boundaries. Simply stated, the
Commonwealth does not enforce its water quality protection laws.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
In 1996, the General Assembly passed a law that added to the
DEQ's ability to fine violators.2" The law allows the DEQ to unilaterally
fine violators up to $10,000.286 The DEQ should forcefully use this new
power; however, it should do so only when the economic advantage the
violator has gained is less than the $10,000 fine limit. In other cases, DEQ
should turn the enforcement over to the OAG to secure a larger and more
commensurate fine. This new power will only be effective if Virginia
alters its historic policy of seeking to ensure compliance through
persuasion rather than enforcement. If Virginia, through the DEQ,
277 See id. at 107.
278 See id.
279 See id.
280 See id.
_81 id.
282 See id.
283 See id.
284 See id.
285 See Acts of Apr. 17, 1996, Va. Acts ch. 1005 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1182,
-1186 (Michie 1998)).
286 See VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1182.
554 [Vol. 23:513
UNITED STATES V. SMITHFIELD: LAX ENFORCEMENT
continues to eschew strong enforcement actions, then a new fine will not
provide any measure of deterrence; the potential loss of $10,000 will not
change a company's actions if it does not believe the fines will be levied.
Accordingly, in concert with this new power to fine, the DEQ
should establish a policy of active enforcement, with an emphasis on the
recovery of economic benefits of non-compliance. The DEQ should focus
on economic benefit and refer to the OAG cases in which the economic
benefit of non-compliance is more than $10,000. DEQ must strive to
make non-compliance economically disadvantageous. Moral questions
aside, there is little disincentive to pollute if the economic punishment
DEQ pursues or obtains is less than the cost of compliance." 7
Furthermore, as previously noted, fines also serve a retributive purpose,
and DEQ should keep that function in mind when deciding what course of
action to choose.
To establish a more active policy of enforcement, the DEQ should
also refer substantially more cases to the OAG for enforcement. Chronic
violators can best be deterred with the significant penalties available only
through civil prosecution. Even one-time violators, however, should be
subject to fines that reduce their economic incentive for non-compliance.
Accordingly, in almost every case in which an economic benefit in excess
of $10,000 accrues to a polluter, the DEQ should refer the case to the
OAG to recoup that benefit. Of course, it is incumbent upon the OAG to
adopt a concurrent aggressive attitude towards litigation and enforcement.
As Smithfield evidences, Virginia's OAG needs to assess and pursue
enforcement actions not on the basis of politics, but rather on the basis of
natural resource protection.
Finally, the General Assembly should raise the limit of DEQ's
unilateral authority to fine violators to at least $25,000 per violation.288
This amount is the limit of the agency's present authority when it has the
2 7 Cf. EPA CIVIL PENALTY POLICY, supra note 251 ("Both deterrence and fundamental
fariness require that the penalty include an additional amount to ensure that the violator is
economically worse off than if it had obeyed the law."); JLARC REPORT, supra note 34, at
77 ("First, penalties have a valuable deterrent effect that can encourage the regulkated
community to anticipate, identify, and correct violations. Second, penalties are also
important to reduce any competitive advantage that one pollution source might receive from
noncompliance."); GAO REPORT, ECONOMIC BENEFITS, supra note 235, at 1 (asserting that
"penalties should serve as a deterrent to violators and should ensure that regulated entites
are treated fairly and consistently .... ).
288 These changes should allow the agency to fine a violator for multiple violations with the
same order instead of limiting the order to one fine level. EPA's class II authority is a
$125,000 fine, and that would be reasonable per violation state parallel.
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violator's consent;289 and beyond its practical effects, a new limit could
also send a strong philosophical message to the regulated community. That
message would be that the state is serious about ensuring that the waters of
Virginia are protected, and that the state will no longer require the consent
of a violator to apply severe punishment.
The Smithfield case should send a signal to Virginia. Although the
company no longer discharges into the Pagan River, its years of
discharging have severely damaged a precious state resource.
Furthermore, the case highlights the failure of the Commonwealth's
conciliatory approach to permit compliance. Smithfield should prompt a
reevaluation of the state's enforcement policy, and Virginia should align
its policy with the law, and with the state's constitutional 290 and DEQ's
statutory mandate291 to protect the waters of the Commonwealth.
289 See VA. CODE ANN. § § 62.1-44.15, 62.1-44.32(a).
29o See VA. CONST. art. XI.
291 See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1183.
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